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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON LABOR MARKETS WITH SEARCH AND INFORMATION FRICTIONS
Joonbae Lee
Benjamin Lester
This dissertation attempts to analyze the wage determination and matching probability
in labor markets with search and information frictions. In the first chapter, I provide a
theoretical framework to analyze the role of job-to-job transition in a worker’s lifetime
wage growth. I use the first-price auction models to analyze the wage determination and
job-to-job transition process, and formulate the inference problem about a worker’s quality
revealed through the worker’s past job history. By doing so, I characterize the mechanism
through which frequent job transitions convey a negative signal about the worker’s quality.
The second chapter, joint work with Hanna Wang, focuses on the market for entry-level jobs
where job seekers send out costly applications in order to match with a potential employer.
With the presence of coordination friction, we characterize the matching probability in a
market with heterogeneous workers and show how restricting the search effort can improve
social welfare. The third chapter reviews the literature on search and information frictions
and identifies the contribution of the two earlier papers.
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CHAPTER 1 : Wage Dynamics with Developing Asymmetric Information
1.1. Introduction
In this paper, I propose a theory of workers’ lifetime wage dynamics that incorporates asymmetry of information –the current employer (the incumbent) knows more about the worker
than an outsider (the poacher)– in the Employment-to-Employment transition. By doing
so, I can identify the channel through which on-the-job search affects both the individual
wage profile and equilibrium inference on worker’s quality. This is important because onthe-job worker search alone cannot account for qualitative differences in job transition –a
transition may occur as a result of poor performance or upon receipt of a better outside offer
regardless of job performance. Indeed, data show that a worker’s wage is negatively correlated with his transition frequency. This contradicts the theoretical result which indicates
that worker search causes wage growth.

1

Job-to-job transition is an important element in understanding a worker’s wage growth.
Many researchers have modeled it as a worker’s ability to engage in on-the-job search
and analyzed its implications to wages, most notably, Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and
Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002). Indeed, in many industries, bringing in a competitor and
negotiating wage is widely accepted as a norm for driving up a worker’s wage. An anecdote
from the consulting industry suggests that, on average, a consultant triggers wage renegotiation following on-the-job search once every three years.2 This observation is more generic,
as Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2017) shows, the macro-level Employment-to-Employment
(henceforth EE) transition rate co-moves strongly with wage growth.
1

3

Light and McGarry (1998) consider two different models of job transition, the “search goods” model and
the “experience goods” model. They show that workers who are more mobile have lower wage paths, which
is consistent with the mechanics of ‘experience goods’ model, in which low current match expectations cause
turnover.
2
I thank Jay Park, who is working in the industry, for this comment.
3
The authors conclude that this possibly reflects workers’ ability to extract rents following an outside offer.
In another paper, Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2016) consider an extension of the Burdett and Mortensen
(1998) model. The model incorporates business cycle fluctuations, and its results fit well with the dynamics
of the EE transition rate and wage growth.

1

In the model, information about worker quality is revealed gradually over time, and the
learning is shared only among the matched party, the worker and his/her current employer.
The information is modeled with a Poisson news process that generates arrival over time
with rate α. Outside firms other than the matched party do not observe this news process.
However, I assume that each worker’s job separation and hiring are public information, as
these events are recorded in a credible and verifiable CV that the worker carries. This is
the public information that is available to outside firms.
An employee working for this firm (incumbent) brings about a meeting with a new firm
(poacher) at Poisson rate λ, which denotes the worker’s on-the-job search intensity.4 When
an outside firm (poacher) contacts this worker, the firm competes against the current firm
(incumbent) for the future service of the worker by playing a first-price auction game like
that in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002). This is a two-player auction where the bidders are
asymmetrically informed.
In this setting, I first focus on the informational content of the worker’s employment history.
When the current employer knows more about the quality of the worker, the new firm
faces the problem of adverse selection – low-quality workers that current employers have
low willingness to pay are the workers most likely to be attracted by the poaching firm.
Therefore, low-quality workers shift jobs more often, while high-quality workers selectively
stay longer in the match. In turn, the average quality of workers increases with tenure.
Next, starting from initial uncertainty about a worker’s type, I analyze how the worker’s
history affects his wage determination. A high-quality worker makes fewer transitions,
and the worker’s wage gradually increases over time. The employer of the worker earns
information rent until the poachers’ estimate about the worker’s quality is accurate. Due
to the asymmetry of information, a low-quality worker can exploit new employers by taking
advantage of their inaccurate belief of his type. However, in the long run, their wage
4

I follow the notations in Burdett and Mortensen (1998), Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002). I do not
distinguish between search by workers who are employed and workers who are unemployed.

2

decreases with job transition, which is consistent with data.
The model has implications for legislation recently introduced in some states, which bars
employers from asking job applicants about wage history. In auctions with asymmetricallyinformed bidders, it is known that the incumbent firm’s information rent decreases as additional dimensions of worker information (e.g., wage history) become public. In my setting,
this implies that, without the wage information, the wage dispersion between high- and lowquality workers increases. The low-quality workers gain from the policy, while high-quality
workers’ wage growth is hurt by adverse selection.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next subsection, I review the literature that is
related to this paper. In Section 2.3, I present the model, and in Section 1.3, I define the
equilibrium of the model. In Section , I present two cases that yield closed-form solutions
and analyze their properties. In Section 1.5, I discuss the implications of the model and the
role of underlying assumptions. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.1.1. Literature Review
This paper contributes to the literature on the labor markets with search friction by adding
in the elements of adverse selection and asymmetric information.
Burdett and Mortensen (1998) first showed that a worker’s ability to engage in on-the-job
search can support continuum of posted wages in equilibrium. For their results, it was
crucial that firms commit to posted wage contracts, that they could not respond to outside
offers. Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) and Moscarini (2005) relaxed the assumption and
solved for the wage-bargaining problem after the arrival of a poacher. In this paper I adopt
their premise that wage is determined by an auction.

5

5
There are some papers that explicitly solves for the alternating-offers bargaining, such as Cahuc et al.
(2006). However, their bargaining equilibrium is qualitatively similar to to that of the Bertrand auction
equilibrium. Modeling the wage-negotiation process as an auction is a commonly accepted practice in the
macro-labor context, although some authors attempt to endogenize the choice of bargaining protocol as in
Doniger (2015) and Flinn et al. (2017). Contrary to the “experience goods” models described in the next
paragraph, these papers focus on aggregate equilibrium.

3

Alongside the “search goods” model of the job mobility, many researchers focus on “experience goods” nature of the jobs, incorporating gradual learning of match quality (Jovanovic
(1979) and Jovanovic (1984).) Moscarini (2005) tried to synthesize both approaches by nesting the “experience goods” job search model into a general equilibrium. My model focuses
on learning about worker quality, rather than idiosyncratic match quality, but replicates
the turnover pattern whereby low-quality matches dissolve quickly. This effect seems to be
prevalent in the data, as shown by Light and McGarry (1998).
My innovation is in incorporating the component of asymmetric-information into these
models. I use the first-price auction model with asymmetrically informed bidders studied
extensively by Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. (1983), and Milgrom and Weber (1982). In a
static setting, the auction game has a well-defined solution, while my technical contribution
is solution of the game in a dynamic environment.

6

I solve for the dynamic equilibrium

where the value of an object sold in the market is endogenous, as it takes into account
the future outcome of the auction. This is also true in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) and
Moscarini (2005), but in my model, the values are non-stationary because the information
asymmetry also evolves over time.
The information asymmetry in my model is generated by the arrival of private information
to an incumbent firm. In that regard, this paper is also closely related to the literature on
dynamic adverse selection, notably, Kim (2017), Hwang (2018) and Camargo and Lester
(2014). These papers analyze trading dynamics in markets for goods and financial assets
when a buyer’s inference on the quality is influenced both by the public information (calendar time), and the correct anticipation of the seller’s equilibrium behavior. It is reasonable
to believe that these effects are also present in labor markets where current employers know
worker characteristics better than others.
6
Wolinsky (1988) solved for seller valuation in a sequential auction game in which a random number of
bidders are attracted over time. In my setting, because I am interested in wage negotiation initiated by
on-the-job search, the auction always has two bidders. Furthermore, Wolinsky (1988) focuses on stationary
equilibrium, while my model exhibits non-stationarity due to the evolution of an observable component of a
worker’s history.

4

Surprisingly little attention has been paid to information frictions in wage determination,
with the exception of Carrillo-Tudela and Kaas (2015), which introduces adverse selection
and screening considerations to the framework used in Burdett and Mortensen (1998). We
both consider an environment in which a worker’s quality is initially unknown to firms.
However, in their setting, workers know their quality, and in return, firms offer screening
contracts that separate good types from bad types. They also assume a particular class of
contract that promotes/demotes based on the realization of a perfectly revealing signal.
In this paper, I focus instead on information asymmetry between firms. I think this is
a natural assumption for many occupations, unless all past worker performance is public.
Although I focus on interaction between firms in job transitions, I generate a similar dynamic
to that of Carrillo-Tudela and Kaas (2015), because the good worker and the bad worker
are treated differently by the incumbent in a wage auction. We both show that unobserved
quality (worker type) can account for the correlation between high job mobility and low
wages.
My work also contributes to the understanding of wage-tenure profile as in Burdett and
Coles (2003) and Stevens (2004), which show that firms optimally choose to backload wages
in order to retain workers. Contrary to their findings, my model generates reverse causality,
in which tenure in a firm increases a worker’s bargaining power. I also provide a learning
channel through which workers drive up their wages, contrary to other explanations such
as human capital accumulation.

1.2. Model
1.2.1. Basic Setting
Model Setup
• Time: Time is continuous. Calendar time is indexed by t ∈ [0, ∞).

5

• Firms: The economy is populated with measure 1 of identical, risk neutral firms. A
firm can hire multiple workers.
• Workers: Workers are either of type H and L (with notation: {H, L}) standing for
High and Low productivity. Both risk neutral. Assume that worker types are sole
input into the production.
• Types (Productivity): Type L workers produce observable flow output normalized to
0. In a small interval of time, type H workers might generate a lump-sum output Y
(breakthrough), at Poisson rate α. Otherwise, they produce 0.
• Payoffs: For a firm with discount rate r > 0, the expected continuation value of a
type H worker’s output is

αY
r

. The continuation value is 0 for a type L worker’s

output. Accordingly, a firm hiring a worker who is H with probability p, at flow wage
w, accrues expected flow profit of

pαY − w.

Flow payoff of the worker is wage w.
• Learning: Firms learn from the output their workers generate. If an employee first
produces a positive output (Y ), then the employer immediately knows that the employee is an H. The employer is uncertain about an employee that has produced
nothing to date. Nevertheless, the longer an employee of a firm produces nothing, the
more likely his/her employer thinks the worker is unproductive.
• On-the-job Search: Outside employment opportunities for a worker arrive at Poisson
rate λ, in ther form of a competing wage offer from an outside poaching firms.
• Asymmetry of Information: I assume that the output is observed only by the current
employer (incumbent). Outsiders, or a poacher only observes a worker’s employment
history.

6

Discussion

Since the focus of this paper is on the adverse selection, I assume that worker

types are the sole input into the production and abstract away from idiosyncratic match
productivity. Also, I will adopt the setting of Burdett and Mortensen (1998), in which a
firm can hire multiple workers, which is not true in a matching model. I also analyze in the
level of an individual worker following the worker’s employment history. A worker’s history
effectively starts with the first job and is not affected by unemployment, which I do not
include in my model.
According to the payoff structure, a worker’s type is learned through a good news process
that generates news with rate α for H workers but generates no news for L workers. It
is reasonable to think of this arrival of this process as a private ‘breakthrough’. There are
several ways to think about the private breakthrough process. First of all, it may be the
output of a worker which cannot be transferred out of the firm because it is the firm’s
property, or because it is confidential. Examples include research output, coded program,
or sales performance. On the other hand, we can think of the information as a subjective
performance measure, which is accurate and correlated across firms. Examples would be
a senior professor’s evaluation of assistant professor, beyond the public output, such as
publication. Lastly, the model might apply to a worker’s teamwork ability, and leadership
which has the feature of an experience good the poachers have less accurate knowledge over.
Even though the perfect good news is assumed for tractability, the mechanics of the model
goes through as long as the incumbent is better informed than a poacher.
1.2.2. Histories and Beliefs
In this section, I define two equilibrium objects that evolve as a function of a worker’s
observable history. I assume that the worker’s employment history is a public information,
as carried around in the form of a resume, or a CV.
Definition 1 (history). A worker’s (employment) history, h(t), is a chronological list of all

7

firms and tenures up until age t:

h(t) = (τ1 , τ2 , . . . , τn ),

t=

n
X

τi

i=1

where τi is the tenure at the i-th firm this worker was employed at.
The firms 1, 2, . . . , n are chronologically ordered so that the n-th firm is the last firm to
employ the worker: the current employer, which we call an incumbent firm. Note that τn
Pt−1
is defined to be t − i=1
τi . In particular, in contrast to the previous tenures (τi , with
i 6= n) that terminated by a transition, the worker need not be ending his tenure at the
current firm (n) at time t. For later reference, it is useful to distinguish between histories
continuing with tenure τn and histories with switch at time t.
Definition 2. Define by h(t) the history continuing with tenure τn at time t, and h̃(t) the
history with tenure τn ending at t.
I define the two equilibrium objects.
Definition 3 (beliefs). p(h(t)) is the incumbent’s belief that the worker is H, if the incumbent did not observe any good news output (breakthrough) after hiring him/her (for
τn duration).
x(h(t)) is the poacher’s belief about the incumbent’s knowledge that the worker is H.
Discussion on Histories

The space of histories consists of partitions of age t, (work

history of length t) into a vector of past tenures in the firms that the worker was employed
at. Formally, we denote the full set of public employment histories of a worker of age t by
H(t), where
H(t) = {(τ1 , τ2 , . . . , τn ) |

n
X

τi = t},

i=1

while a particular employment history is an element h(t) ∈ H(t). A worker is never unemployed in my model, and the set of tenures add up to the age t. Firm n is the incumbent
firm that currently hires the worker. Note that τn is the continuation of current tenure.

8

Unlike other tenures τi , (i < n), τn might or might not terminate at t.
Since I assume a continuum of firms being drawn randomly in a meeting process, any two
firms in a worker’s employment history are distinct firms. Furthermore, concerning the
meeting process (happening at a Poisson rate λ) outlined above, note that the history
reflects only the meetings that resulted in transition. It may be that a worker generated a
meeting, but did not transit, as these events are not reflected in the history.
Potentially, there may be other elements of a worker’s history that are also observable and
informative, such as wages, or the identity of the firm. I abstract away from the possibilities
for now, but later discuss what happens when the wage is also public.
Discussion on Beliefs Poachers (outside firms) do not observe the output process and
form belief about the information in the current match, conditioning only on the public
information, the employment history.
To elaborate on the belief p, note first that the incumbent’s belief that the worker’s quality
is high, P , is a mapping
P : H(t) × 1(τn ) → [0, 1],
where 1(τn ) is a indicator random variable of whether the incumbent firm has observed the
H output for the duration of τn .
Given an employment history h(t), the mapping is given by



P (h(t), 1) = 1


P (h(t), 0) = p(h(t)) :=

p0 e−ατn
p0 e−ατn +(1−p0 )

where p0 is the initial expectation of the worker’s quality at the point of hire. I relegate
to the later sections the details on p0 . In essence, it is pinned down by the history of the
worker up until t − τn , (h̃(t − τn )), and the bid the incumbent firm made at the point of
attracting the worker.
9

Since the arrival of a good output follows a Poisson news process of arrival rate α, the
probability that a H type worker generates no arrival for the duration of τn (τn > 0) is
e−ατn . The belief p(h(t)) is obtained using Bayes’ rule, or by solving the ODE for the
Poisson good-news drift starting from an initial belief p0 :7
p0 (τn ) = −αp(τn )(1 − p(τn )),

p(0) = p0 .

The drift equation reflects the fact that the incumbent firm becomes more pessimistic about
the worker quality, as time elapses without observing a good output. It is sufficient to track
only the pessimistic belief p(h(t)), since the belief jumps up to 1 with the arrival of a good
output.
Now, we focus on the belief of the poacher (outside firm), x(h(t)). Define x(h(t)) as the
poacher’s Bayes rational belief over the incumbent’s observation of output:

x(h(t)) := P r({P (h(t), 1(τn )) = 1}).

The belief is affected by several elements. First, it is affected by the incumbent’s additional
information about the worker, belief about the initial expectation (p0 ) and the good output
realization within τn . In order to avoid complication, assume the incumbent and the poacher
agrees on the initial expectation p0 .
Assumption 1. Assume that the incumbent and the poacher agrees on the initial expectation
about the worker’s quality p0 , given the public employment history h(t − τn ).
A particular example of an implementation of this assumption is presented in Section 1.4.1,
in the form of Assumption 5.
If both firms agree on the initial quality, p0 , then the only divergence in information is
whether the incumbent has observed a good ouput for the last τn duration. From this fact,
7
Derivation is contained in Appendix 1.7.1 for the readers who are not familiar with continuous time
belief process with Poisson news.
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Tenure in the current firm
Past jobs and transitions
Good output (Y )
Failed poaching attempts
Belief

Incumbent
O
O
O
O
p(h(t)) or 1

Poacher
O
O
X
X
x(h(t))

Table 1: Summary of Information Structure
it might be tempting to say that x(h(t)) is given by


x(h(t)) = p0 1 − e−ατn .

However, this is not the whole story because the poacher does not know if there was any
other failed poaching attempts that are not reflected in the public employment history. The
Bayes-rational outsider knows the following: the poaching attempts arrive at the Poisson
rate λ, and among them, only those that resulted in a job transition are shown in the
employment history. The outsider’s estimate is biased without taking into account the
failed poaching attempts that are not observed. I summarize the elements of information
structure in Table 1.
1.2.3. Wage Auction
While the worker is hired, he/she generates meeting with a new firm (poacher) at Poisson
rate λ. This is an exogenous process at which the worker meets another firm, and is the
only opportunity for a worker to shift to a new job. If the worker does not shift to a new
job, the worker continues in the current job.
Assume that, once the poacher contacts the worker, the two firms (incumbent and poacher)
compete for the future service of the worker through a common value first-price sealed-bid
auction. Furthermore, we assume that, by initiating this auction, the worker fully commits
to accept the result of the auction, by shifting to whichever firm that offers higher bid.
From the assumption, strategic players of an auction are the informed incumbent and the
11

uninformed poacher. Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. (1983) have already studied the first price
auction game between informed and uninformed bidders, in a static and symmetric payoff
setting. For reference, we summarize the main results of the paper in the Appendix 1.7.2
and proceed to think about how the result modifies in our setting.
In our setting, the informed bidder receives a fully revealing signal about the value of an
object (the employee): the firm’s value takes on one of two possible numbers, depending
on whether the bidder received information (arrival of α) or not. The Bayes rational belief
about the firms’ information x, corresponds to the distribution of the firm’s signal. Formally:
Definition 4. The symmetric-payoff, common-value first-price auction game with asymmetric information at time t, when the beliefs are x = x(h(t)) and p = p(h(t)), consists
of
• Two bidders: Informed I (Incumbent), and Uninformed P (P oacher)
• Informed I can be of two types: {Ih, I0} for observing/not observing the news.
Uninformed P is of only one type: P ∅ since he does not know about the news arrival.
• Two ex-post valuations: 0 ≤ ΠI0 < ΠIh , for I, while the expected value of the worker

ΠP ∅ = xΠI0 + (1 − x)ΠIh

• Signals: I observes binary signal that informs



Π

Ih

with probability x



ΠI0 with probability 1 − x

Applying the result from Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. (1983):
Proposition 1. The game has a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium where:
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1. The support of the bids is [ΠI0 , Π̃], where Π̃ = xΠIh + (1 − x)ΠI0 .
2. Both players submit mixed bids according to the distribution

G(b) =

(1 − x)(ΠIh − ΠI0 )
,
ΠIh − b

b > ΠI0

where, mixed strategy for player Ih, I0 and P ∅ satisfy:

GP ∅ (b) = G(b),

xGIh (b) + (1 − x)GI0 (b) = G(b),
and GI0 (b) = 1 for all b ≥ ΠI0 and 0 otherwise.
Figure 1 depicts a particular pair of distributions. This result is derived using indifference
conditions as in Appendix 1.7.3. We note that the equilibrium strategies imply that with
positive probability there are ex-post instances where bidder P ∅ regrets winning. This is the
well-known “winner’s curse” in auctions with common values and asymmetric information.
However, in order for the bidder P ∅ to participate in the auction, and to bid non-trivial
bids, there has to be some instances in which bidder P ∅ wins positive profit, which happens
when Ih loses the auction.
Note that, in the equilibrium of the auction game, there is non-zero probability of tie at
ΠI0 . For later sections, in order to make probability calculations easy, I assume that in case
of a tie, P ∅ wins. Later, I show that this corresponds to an efficient tie breaking rule.
Assumption 2. Tie is resolved in favor of the poacher P ∅.
Discussion

I am effectively ruling out the worker’s decision in the wage determination.

It is restrictive, because as we later show in the equilibrium section, that a worker might
have profitable deviation of reneging on his/her commitment to the auction outcome, and
wait for the next wage auction where the poachers have more favorable belief about the
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Figure 1: Distribution of Bids GIh and GP ∅ , with x = 0.6, ΠIh = 1, ΠI0 = 0
worker. However, although continual switching is not optimal in the early phase of the
career, the result will go through for later phase of the worker’s career, because the worker
has to ultimately cash-in the benefits by initiating an auction. Furthermore, a worker’s
incentive to renege on the auction outcome will be less if the worker anticipates that by
reneging, the incumbent will exploit the worker until the next auction. Hence, we highlight
our main assumption as:
Assumption 3. The players in the wage auction game are two firms (incumbent and poacher).
The worker abides by the auction rule and chooses a firm that offers better wage.

1.3. Equilibrium
I solve for equilibrium the in a dynamic environment. In essence, the value of the firm from
winning the auction is the annuity value of the worker’s output net the future bids the firm
has to make in order to retain the worker. The auction equilibrium with the given values
exhibits differential rate at which H and L workers are leaving the current match. Hence,
the Bayes rational beliefs take into account the win probabilities of the auction. The path
of beliefs in turn affects the evolution of values, which affects the present discounted value
14

of the future profits. The equilibrium is a fixed point in which the objects are consistent
with each other.
Formally, the equilibrium objects are given by
Proposition 2 (Equilibrium). The equilibrium consists of paths of beliefs x, p : H(t) →
[0, 1], paths of values ΠIh , ΠI0 : H(t) → R, and the mixed bidding strategies GIh , GI0 , GP ∅
that maps from H(t) such that:
• During the continuation of tenure, x(t) = x(h(t)) evolves according to the ODE:
0

x (t) =

Z


GP ∅ (v|h(t)) dGIh (v|h(t)) λx(t)(1 − x(t)) + α(1 − x(t))p(h(t))

• During the continuation of tenure, p(t) = p(h(t)) evolves according to the ODE:
p0 (t) = −αp(t)(1 − p(t)),

• During the continuation of tenure, ΠIh (t) = ΠIh (h(t)) and ΠI0 (t) = ΠI0 (h(t)) solves
the ODE’s:
−Π0Ih (t)

Z
(ΠIh (t) − v)GP ∅ (v|h(t)) dGIh (v|h(t))

+ (r + λ)ΠIh (t) = αY + λ



−Π0I0 (t) + (r + λ + αp(t))ΠI0 (t) = αp(t) Y + ΠIh (t)

(Ih)

(I0)

• {GIh , GI0 , GP ∅ } are equilibrium mixed strategies of an auction with values ΠIh (h(t)),
ΠI0 (h(t)) for an incumbent where h(t) is a history with continuation of tenure at time
t, and values ΠIh (h̃(t)), ΠI0 (h̃(t)) for a poacher, where h̃(t) is a history with job shift
at time t.
The equilibrium solves for the fixed points of the beliefs, values and the auction equilibrium.
The readers who are interested in the characterizations of the equilibrium can skip to the
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next Section 1.4. For detailed derivation of the conditions, readers can refer to the Appendix
1.7.4 where we invoke a limit argument from a discrete model as dt → 0.
Discussion on Beliefs

The drift of belief p is coming from the Bayes rule, taking into

account the incumbent’s growing pessimism with no arrival of good output. The initial
condition is what the incumbent firm, and the outside firms, believe about the quality of
the worker when the incumbent poached the worker from the previous firm. Note that, with
maximum bid on the support, the firm expects to win for sure, and the expected quality of
the worker is at most x + (1 − x)p < 1 because of the adverse selection.
Lastly, the drift equation for the belief x is the addition of two components:
0

x (t) =

Z
|


GP ∅ (v|t) dGIh (v|t) λx(t)(1 − x(t)) + α(1 − x(t))p(h(t))
{z
}
|
{z
}
(2)
(1)

The first component (1) is the bad news drift coming from the differential rate at which
the good and bad workers are leaving the firm. Due to the tie-breaking rule assumption,
if any other poacher was to arrive (at rate λ) before a poacher’s arrival at τ , the earlier
poacher must have taken the no news worker for sure, while the good workers have nonzero probability of being retained by the incumbent. Therefore, job-to-job transition in a
worker’s history is an imperfect bad news about the worker’s type. (1) shows that there
is growing optimism about the worker’s type as the worker’s tenure in the firm increases.
Part (2) is additional flow of learning (αp) from the pool of workers with no news so far.
Discussion on (Ih), (I0)

These are all local conditions, or annuity equations for the

expected future value of the firms. Although most of the results follow directly from the
definition of the auction equilibrium and annuity equations, it is worth mentioning a few
intuitions from the expressions. Note that the last condition implies, from no knowledge
about the worker’s type except for the initial expectation p, that the poacher’s value is
ΠI0 with the starting beliefs. Integrating the annuity equation (I0) yields the following
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expression for the value:
Z
ΠI0 (h̃(t)) = αp(h̃(t))

∞



e−(α+λ+r)s Y + ΠIh (h̃(t + s)) ds

(I0’)

0

where h̃(t + s) is the history with continuation in this firm for duration of s. The derivation
of the result is relegated to Appendix 1.7.5.
The equation is intuitive because it is the discounted value of transition to the learned state
Ih at any future point t + s, with discount rate is the sum of three components, (1) the
rate of transition to state Ih, α, (2) the rate of losing the worker before any transition
arrival, λ, (3) and the discount rate r. Since the poacher does not observe any output,
x(h̃(t)) = 0. The match starts from initial belief p(h̃(t)). Note, however, the ΠI0 is not
stationary because ΠIh is changing over time.
Now we move on to the value of learning the good type at the history of continuation at
time t, ΠIh (h(t)). The discounted value of the future auctions matters both in terms of
continuation probability and the expected bid payment. However, since all the bids on the
support of the auction equilibrium induces same expected payoff, we can use the indifference
condition to write down the value equation as if the incumbent firm wins all future auctions
with probability 1:


−Π0Ih (t) + (r + λ)ΠIh (t) = αY + λ ΠIh (t) − V̄ (t)

(Ih’)

where V̄ (t) is the maximum bid over the support of GP ∅ (v|h(t)). The flow profit is given
by
αY − λV̄ (t)
flow expected produce minus the expected cost of retainment. Integrating over time yields:
αY
λ
ΠIh (t) =
−
r
r

Z
t
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∞

e−r(s−t) Ṽ (s) ds

which has a clear interpretation of expected future value of the worker net the expected
future (maximum) bids, in order to retain the worker.
In particular, when the cost is assumed to be held constant forever at V̄ ,
Z ∞
αY
e−r(s−t) V̄ ds
ΠIh (t) =
−λ
r
t
αY
λ
=
− V̄ .
r
r
A natural reason for V̄ to be fixed is because the worker quality is known to be H and the
belief does not evolve. In case, V̄ is the value of starting a new employment from belief 1,
which is given by:
Z
ΠI0 = α

∞

e−(α+λ+r)s [Y + ΠIh ] ds.

0

Substituting in the ΠIh allows us to solve for ΠI0 :

ΠI0 =



αY
α
λ
Y +
− ΠI0
α+λ+r
r
r

Algebra yields:8
ΠI0 = ΠIh =

αY
,
r+λ

a stationary expression for both Ih and I0. This is intuitive because when the worker’s
type is known to be High, everytime the worker meets another firm, Bertrand auction drives
down the value of the firm to 0. Furthermore, both Ih and I0 know the worker’s type and
is anticipated to receive the same expected profit.
8

Expanding,


α
λ
α
α+r
Π10 =
Y
α+λ+r r
α+λ+r r
(r + α)(r + λ)
α
α+r
Π10 =
Y
(α + λ + r)r
α+λ+r r

1+

and
Π1h =

λ αY
αY
αY
−
=
.
r
r r+λ
r+λ
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Discussion on Auction The auction equilibrium characterized in Section 1.2.3 mostly
applies to the equilibrium. However, the auction is equilibrium is more general because the
values of winning the auction is different for the two bidders. The discrepancy comes from
the history of the worker. If the incumbent firm wins, the worker’s history is a continuation
history h(t), but if the poacher wins, the transition is made public in the new history h̃(t).
In general, the firm’s values as calculated by (I0) and (Ih) need not coincide for the two
histories. In the next section, I focus on the cases in which I can characterize the equilibrium
despite the complications.

1.4. Characterization of the Equilibrium
In order to solve for the equilibrium, it is necessary to keep track of the evolution of beliefs
and the values at the same time. Below, I provide two examples where I can solve for the
equilibrium objects in the closed form. For the first case, I assume short-lived firms whose
values are stationary. From the first case, I derive an implication for the inference on worker
quality from the observed employment history. For the second case, I impose an additional
assumption on the auction rule. By doing so, I characterize the evolution of a firm’s value,
and its implication to the lifetime wage profile.
1.4.1. Solvable Case 1: Stationarity by Replacement of Firms
In this section I impose an assumption that makes firm values stationary. From there, I can
solve for the Markov equilibrium in which the aforementioned two beliefs are state variables.
Note that the complications arise because the expected future profit of the firm has to take
into account the future auction outcomes. In order to get around the issue, I assume that
the firms are ‘replaced’ by a new firm every time a poacher arrives at rate λ. This can have
interpretation of a new department within the same firm competing for the worker, or that
there is a new manager introduced every new round of an auction. Another way to justify it
is to say that the lifetime of a manager is short enough compared to the poaching attempt,
which arrives only occassionally. The auction game is still played between the informed
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bidder (successor firm/manager of the ‘incumbent’) and an uninformed bidder (‘poacher’).
Assumption 4. The manager is replaced with the arrival of a poacher (at rate λ), and
his/her expected lifetime is
Values

1
λ.

Assuming so, the future auction outcomes are effectively ruled out from the value

calculation, and I take into account only the use value of this worker until the next auction. The values are stationary due to the memoryless property of a Poisson process. The
expected duration of the match is always

1
λ.

Proposition 3 (Values (I0), (Ih)). Given a history h(t) and beliefs x = x(h(t)) and
p = p(h(t)), the values of the incumbent are ΠIh (h(t)) =

αY
r+λ ,

αY
and ΠI0 (h(t)) = p r+λ
.

αY
, where p̃ is the initial belief on worker quality,
The value of a poacher is ΠI0 (h̃(t)) = p̃ r+λ

having won the auction. p̃ satisfies p ≤ p̃ ≤ x + (1 − x)p.
In this environment, the value of a worker is linear in its belief about quality p. With the
observation of a good output, the value jumps to

αY
r+λ .

Auction Equilibrium Since the values are stationary, it suffices to know only the point
beliefs x = x(h(t)) and p = p(h(t)) to characterize the values at the time of an auction.
Although information variables evolve over time, the auction game itself is a repeated static
auction: after a transition shock (λ), there is a new auction game between two bidders; one
informed and the other uninformed.
The informed bidder’s value for the worker takes two points:

αY
r+λ

with probability x, and

Y
(p = p(h(t))) with probability 1 − x. Since the winning poacher does not know
αp r+λ

whether the worker is H at the time of poaching, the game is different from the static
auction, in which the value of the object is revealed instantly after winning. However, the
two auctions are very similar in the sense that, in the static auction, the uncertainty is
taken into account at the bidding stage, while in this environment, the uncertainty matters
after winning the auction. Indeed, the auction equilibrium is very similar to the static case
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as shown below:
Proposition 4. The equilibrium bids of the auction game with belief p = p(h(t)) and
x = x(h(t)) come from the support




αY
αY
, (x + (1 − x)p) r+λ
.
p r+λ

αY
Bidder I0 bids p r+λ
, and the equilibrium expected profit of the uninformed poacher is 0.

The distribution of bidder Ih bids, GIh , solves the indifference condition for bidder P ∅:
 xG (v) + (1 − x)p  αY
Ih
− v = 0,
xGIh (v) + (1 − x) r + λ
 αY

αY
for all v ∈ p r+λ
, (x + (1 − x)p) r+λ
.
The distribution of bidder P ∅ bids, GP ∅ , solves the indifference condition for bidder Ih:

GP ∅ (v)

αY
αY
αY
− v) =
− (x + (1 − x)p)
,
r+λ
r+λ
r+λ

 αY

αY
for all v ∈ p r+λ
, (x + (1 − x)p) r+λ
.
αY
, the
From the assumption, in case of a tie, which happens with positive probability at p r+λ

poacher wins the worker.
Beliefs

Given the auction equilibrium, I can calculate the winning probabilities. The

incumbent I0 loses the worker for sure, while the incumbent Ih wins with probability
1 − 12 x. The probability can be calculated explicitly from the bidding strategies, as in
Appendix 1.7.6. Using this information, the drift of beliefs with the continuation in tenure
forms an autonomous system:
Proposition 5. The pair of beliefs (x, p) as function of tenure τ in a firm solves the following
ODE’s:


1
x0 (τ ) = λ 1 − x(τ ) x(τ )(1 − x(τ )) + α(1 − x(τ ))p(τ )
2
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p0 (τ ) = −αp(τ )(1 − p(τ ))
from starting belief p(0) and x(0) = 0.
The evolution of beliefs reflect that the workers with good output is retained in the firm
with probability 1 − 12 x.
Earlier, in Section 1.2.2, I made an assumption (Assumption 1) that the incumbent and the
poacher agree on the starting belief p0 . In the current setting, this can be done by making
a technical assumption that the poaching wage is publicly observed.
Assumption 5. A worker’s employment history shows the winning bid a poacher has made
at the time of the worker’s transition.
The assumption is made purely for a technical reason and does not have a substantive
element. Under this assumption, the poacher’s expected profit from winning an auction is
0, and the starting belief from a winning bid v is given by:
xGIh (v) + (1 − x)p
,
xGIh (v) + (1 − x)
where x = x(h(t)), p = p(h(t)), and the bid distribution, GIh , is from the auction equilibrium calculated above, with beliefs x and p. In essence, given the equilibrium bidding
strategies, it is the expected quality of a worker derived from Bayes rule.
To summarize, the divergence of histories h(t) and h̃(t) at time t is reflected in the beliefs

(x, p) given by x(h(t)), p(h(t)) , and

x(h̃(t)) = 0, p(h̃(t)) =

Simulated Wage Paths

xGIh (v) + (1 − x)p
.
xGIh (v) + (1 − x)

Since the system of beliefs is autonomous, an individual’s career

path can be readily simulated given a prior belief, transition shocks, and the outcomes of
auctions, the bids from which governing the starting belief in a new tenure.
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Figures 2, 3 depict a simulated path of beliefs and wages for two types of workers, using the
identical transition shocks that arrived at times ( 0.61 1.22 2.73 3.84 6.42 7.06 11.63 ).
The arrival of transition shocks are denoted with vertical dotted red lines.
Note that the L type worker shifted every time there was a transition shock because incumbent did not want to bid for the worker. These episodes are shown by the vertical dashed
red lines exhibiting sharp drop in beliefs. The last episode at 11.63 pushed the belief down
close to 0 because the poacher could win the worker with a very small bid.
Notice also that the belief path of H type workers is more smooth because some of the
transition shocks did not result in transition. For this example, poaching attempts at
time 0.61, 1.22, 3.84 and 11.63 were deterred by the incumbent; note the wage jumps at
these points despite the smooth evolution of beliefs. These are instances of the incumbent
matching the worker’s outside offer. Even when the worker transitted to a new firm, (points
2.73, 6.42, and 7.06), the drop in beliefs were milder compared to the L workers because
the poacher had to bid high enough to win against the incumbent. But also note that two
close-by transition shocks at 6.42 and 7.06 resulted in sharp drop in the belief at point
7.06. Probably what happened is that the worker could not generate news during the short
duration of tenure, and the poacher at 7.06 could win the worker with a relatively small
bid.
In the end, the beliefs converge to the correct level. The histories diverge for the two workers
because high type workers on average has longer tenure in a firm; with the arrival of a good
output, the H workers are bid by two firms, while the L workers are always bid only by
the poacher. In the limit, for a long enough history, public information would be enough
to distinguish the two types. However, note that the belief about H worker’s type jumps
down whenever there is a shift to a new firm, since L workers are more likely to leave the
match (this is an imperfect bad news); while the L workers also exhibit upward belief drift
between any two transition shocks.
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Figure 2: Simulated Belief and Wage Paths for Case 1, L type worker
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Figure 3: Simulated Belief and Wage Paths for Case 1, H type worker
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1.4.2. Solvable Case 2: Restriction on Auction Rule
For this case, I make the following assumption which is convenient, while retaining the main
mechanism of the auction game:
Assumption 6. Recall option: The incumbent can buy the worker back from the poacher by
bribing the poacher in case the poacher won the H worker. The incumbent pays the future
value of the worker to the poaching firm.
The incumbent is indifferent between paying out the future value of the worker and losing
the worker. The poacher still has incentive to bid in the auction because there is positive
probability that he might win over the high type worker and is bribed, or reimbursed in
cash by the incumbent. This assumption has the benefit of fixing the transition rule ex-ante
for different types of workers (H worker always stays, while L worker always shifts), and
making the auction game that of symmetric values.
Beliefs

Under this new auction rule, when the poacher wins the auction and realizes

that the incumbent does not bribe, the firm immediately knows that the worker has not
generated a news in the previous firm. On top of that, since the worker transfers if and
only if the worker did not generate any news in any of the previous employers, the belief p
is effectively the function of starting belief p0 and elapsed time in the market t only:

p(h(t)) = p(t),

where
p(t) =

p0 e−αt
p0 e−αt + (1 − p0 )

from intial belief p0 .
The belief x reverts back to 0 everytime a worker makes transition, and the drift of belief
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at tenure τ , calendar time t is:
x0 (t) = λx(t)(1 − x(t)) + α(1 − x(t))p(t)

starting from x(t − τ ) = 0. This equation can be solved for x in closed form, as attached in
Appendix 1.7.7.
Auction Equilibrium

The time variable t is calendar time, with knowledge of the point
Pn−1
of the last job transition, i=1 τi . ΠIh (h(t)) and ΠI0 (h(t)) are the values of the incumbent.
It is clear that the candidate lower bound of the bids is ΠI0 (h(t)) since I0 bidder never bids
above it.
The poacher’s value at time t is evaluated over a different history, h̃(t). However, from the
bribing assumption, the poacher only obtains a no news worker. That is, when the poacher
indeed wins a worker, the expected value of the worker ΠI0 (h̃(t)) starts from initial belief
p(t) and x(t) = 0:
∞

Z
ΠI0 (h̃(t)) = αp(t)

e−(α+λ+r)s ΠIh (h̃(t + s)) ds

0

In case the poacher is bribed, the poacher receives transfer

ΠIh (h(t))

from the incumbent.
Overall, the poacher expects at most

x(t)ΠIh (h(t)) + (1 − x(t))ΠI0 (h̃(t)),
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from bidding the upper bound of the support, which is

x(t)ΠIh (h(t)) + (1 − x(t))ΠI0 (h(t)).

Therefore, the poacher’s expected profit from the auction is:

(1 − x(t))(ΠI0 (h̃(t)) − ΠI0 (h(t)))

where h̃(t) is continuation from starting belief p(t) and x(t) = 0, in comparison to h(t) from
p(t) and x(t) ≥ 0. I later verify that the expression is positive in equilibrium. Intuitively,
the two paths agree on the quality of the worker p(t), but differs only in what others believe
about the worker, x(t). h(t) is a history that is more costly to fight off a poacher.
In this case, given x = x(t), the indifference condition for the poacher that defines distribution GIh is given by:

xGIh (v|t)(ΠIh (h(t)) − v) + (1 − x)(ΠI0 (h̃(t)) − v) = (1 − x)(ΠI0 (h̃(t)) − ΠI0 (h(t))).

In turn, the support of the bids is
h

i
ΠI0 (h(t)), x(t)ΠIh (h(t)) + (1 − x(t))ΠI0 (h(t)) .

Since the upper bound of the support contains information about how much the incumbent
has to pay in order to keep the match with probability 1, this feature allows us to write the
incumbent’s value autonomously in terms of ΠIh (h(t)) and ΠI0 (h(t)) only, without knowing
about the worker’s value in a new match.
Values

Denote by ΠIh (t) and ΠI0 (t) the continuation values for the incumbent, following

history h(t). From the set of beliefs, the values solve the system of equations:
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•
−Π0I0 (t) + (r + λ + αp(t))ΠI0 (t) = αp(t)[Y + ΠIh (t)]

(I0)

•
−Π0Ih (t)

Z
+ (r + λ)ΠIh (t) = αY + λ

(ΠIh (t) − v)GP ∅ (v|t) dGIh (v|t)

(Ih)

Proposition 6. Using the fact that v̄ = x(t)ΠIh (t) + (1 − x(t))ΠI0 (t), the second ODE can
be rewritten:
−Π0Ih (t) + (r + λ)ΠIh (t) = αY + λ(1 − x(t))(ΠIh (t) − ΠI0 (t)).

(Ih’)

Note that this is a non-homogeneous system of ODE’s (x(t) and p(t) are changing over
time) with two variables ΠIh and ΠI0 . Still, it is an autonomous system of two variables,
in which I can characterize some properties of the solution:
Proposition 7. Fix time t, and the beliefs x(t), and p(t). The value at time t that the
incumbent firm has to pay in order to retain the worker for sure (i.e., upper bound of the
bidding support) is given by
Z
αY

∞



e−(r+λ)(z−t) x(z) + (1 − x(z))p(z) dz,

t

which is the integral over future path of the quality of the workers in the firm x(z) + (1 −
x(z))p(z), for z ∈ [t, ∞).
The expression is intuitive in the sense that it integrates over the path of future beliefs
regarding the quality of the worker staying in the firm. The firm’s profit is shown to be
decreasing over time, as the cost term increases with time. The proof involves solving the
system of equations using substitution, and the readers can refer to Appendix 1.7.8 for full
proof. The full path of firm profits ΠIh , ΠI0 can be also found accordingly, although the
expressions are much messier. Note that in the limit, x(z) + (1 − x(z))p(z) approaches 1,
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and the cost term goes to
αY
.
r+λ
This verifies that a firm’s information rent decreases with time.
A few basic properties of the value function is outlined here:
Proposition 8. For any h(t), ΠIh (h(t)) is decreasing in α and decreasing in λ. A poacher’s
value ΠI0 (h̃(t)) is increasing in α and increasing in p0 = p(h̃(t)).
Proof. Since the closed form of x and p are known, the closed form for the x̃(t) = x(t) +
(1 − x(t))p(t) is:


α
p0 α+λ
1 − e−(α+λ)t + p0 e−(α+λ)t



.
x̃(t) =
α
1 − e−(α+λ)t + e−λt p0 e−αt + (1 − p0 )
p0 α+λ
The result is just a substitution of this expression into the Proposition 7. Details of the
procedure is contained in Appendix 1.7.9

Simulated Path of Wages

Below is a simulated path of beliefs x and p for a particular

realization of Poisson arrivals, when both λ and α are set at 31 . The blue line stands for the
poacher’s belief x about the news arrival in the incumbent; while the green line stands for
the incumbent’s belief that the worker’s type is H, p. The green line is gradually decreasing
from p0 according to a good news drift. Note that with the arrival of output at point 4.2,
the incumbent’s belief (green line, on the right) jumps up to 1 and stays there after.
Note also that in the left graph of Figure 4, the slope of the poacher’s belief gets smaller as
the time goes on. This is because the growth of x is affected by learning, which happens
at rate αp(t). Everytime the worker transits, the belief starts to grow again from 0, and
the initial growth rate is affected by the initial level of optimism about the worker’s type.
Therefore, even for the same H type of workers, if one happens to draw the news at a
later point in career, the wage growth rate thereafter will be slower than when the worker
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Figure 4: Simulated Path of Beliefs
9

happened to draw the news at an early point in career.
For these two paths simulated for the length of 30, we see that they start to diverge after
the arrival of the good news. Before then, the transition shocks (rate λ) affects the two
workers in the same way by driving the outside firm’s belief back into 0. For L type workers,
everytime the worker meets another firm, the worker transits to a new firm, which drives
down the poacher’s belief, x, back to 0. H type workers are not explicitly affected since
there is no transition. However, the competitors infer postive news about the worker’s type
as the worker’s tenure increases (smooth increasing part in the right figure). Ultimately,
the belief reaches the correct one, x = 1 for sufficiently long tenure.
I now investigate how the belief path translates to wages paid to the worker. I use the
9
x in blue and p in green. Initial belief set at p0 = 0.5. Arrival of transition shocks, which arrives at rate
λ, shown by the kinks at the left Figure. For H workers, learning shock occured at time 4.2, indicated by
red dotted line.
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Figure 5: Sample Wage Paths for the Two Types of Workers
proxy, the retaining cost term, which we wrote as
Z
αY

∞



e−(r+λ)(s−t) x(s) + (1 − x(s))p(s) ds

t

These are calculated from the last observed transition, and is a function of tenure. We
solve for this integral and normalize for the termination rate of the match r + λ to be the
proxy for the constant wage paid to the worker. Note that this is an upper bound of the
actual wage paid since actual wage is determined by the outcome of the auction. We graph
a corresponding sample wage paths below:
The wage paths start to diverge after the arrival of news: for the H type workers, longer
duration of stay in the match signals outside firms that the worker is of high quality, and
the incumbent firm has to pay more in order to fight off the poachers who are bidding more
aggressively for this worker. In the end, the wage is driven up to the productivity of the
match, αY . For the L types, although they might initially draw high wage by luck, the
wage converges to 0 as the work history drives belief down close to 0.
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I expect the wage path of L workers to exhibit a hump pattern. Although the wage growth
in the middle age is driven by the fact that they start from wage 0, it is also magnified by
firm’s information rent.

1.5. Discussions
1.5.1. Role of Job Transition in Wage Growth and Long-Run Convergence
For both the case 1 and case 2, the long-run convergence is obvious. For case 2, a worker
with a good news is kept with probability 1, and the belief about the worker’s quality
gradually converges to 1. In case 1, whenever a transition shock arrives, L workers shift
with probability 1, while H workers shift with probability less than 1. After observing
employment history for long enough, the firms can distinguish the two types.
Proposition 9. For case 1, the average tenure of a L worker is λ1 , while the average tenure
of a H worker is greater than

1
λ.

For long enough job history, the firms correctly learn the

worker’s type.
Since both workers start from a pool with initial belief p0 , the proposition implies that H
workers, in the long run, raise their wage to 1, while for L workers, wage goes down to 0.
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Figure 6: Simulated Average Belief and Wage Path for H Types (Left) and L Types (Right)
Figure 6 shows an average path of belief and wage for the two types respectively, an average
path of 50 different simulated wage paths, following case 1 environment. Note that the path
still exhibits many kinks due to a large heterogeneity of path realizations. However, there
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is noticeable trend of the belief and the wage converging to the correct level.
The model implies that, on average, workers with frequent job transitions are likely to
be low-quality workers, and the number of transitions is negatively correlated with wage.
Light and McGarry (1998) shows that unobserved heterogeneity can account for negative
correlation between number of job transitions and low wages. This is in contrast to ‘search
goods’ explanation of job transition, in which job transition indicates that a worker moving
to a better paying job, and hence, more transitions increase a worker’s wage. The authors
conclude that the data is more consistent with ‘experience goods’ model, in which the
transition is initiated by dissolution of a match that is doing poorly.
Carrillo-Tudela and Kaas (2015) has also pointed out that perfect information model of job
transition cannot account for the unobserved heterogeneity. Their modelling method differs
from this paper, in that they focus on firms’ screening and worker sorting. Both the theory
and data shows that it is important to take into account unobservable heterogeneity of the
workers, and a natural modelling choice is to incorporate asymmetry of information. This
paper presents one way of modelling asymmetry of information, in a natrual environment
in which some employers know more about the worker than the others.
In a different line, there are papers showing that lifetime earning paths diverge significantly
for workers in different percentiles of income. A report by Guvenen et al. (2015) analyses
the lifetime earnings of more than 4 million workers using their W2 record. What they
show is a large heterogeneity in lifetime earnings growth. Bottom 20 percentile of workers
exhibit lifetime earnings decrease, while a median worker experiences 38% increase in lifetime earnings. Even after controlling for extreme outliers, top percentile workers’ gain in
lifetime earnings is about 1500%.
There are many ways to account for the heterogeneity, and learning is one possible explanation. Farber (2005) used survey data of displaced workers (due to slack work, plant closing,
or position abolishment) and showed that about 10% of the displaced workers permanently
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leave the labor force after displacement. Even for those who return, 13% are hired at parttime jobs after losing a full-time job, and the re-employment income is on average 13% less
than the previous job. There are many factors underlying this phenomenon, including the
age effect (the authors focus on life-cycle earnings), and firm specific human capital that is
lost at displacement. However, it is also documented that there is noticeable ‘stigma’ effect
to workers who lose jobs, and in order to account for the effect, it is necessary to incorporate
learning in the model. This paper suggests one step into the direction, and future work will
involve identifying the effect of learning within a comparable sample of small cohort with
similar characteristics (same college, MBA program, etc.) and checking if the job transition
affect these workers differently.
1.5.2. Implications to the Information Policy
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Figure 7: Simulated Wage Profile for Full-Information
10

It is worthwhile comparing with the benchmark case where the learning is a public news.
The benchmark case is a very simple example of Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) model
10

As in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002). The thicker lines (full-information wage profile) allow for comparison with the case with the thin lines (wage profile under asymmetric information, from the previous
section). Note that H type workers boost up the wage to 1 in early career, while the wage of L type workers
gradually decline along the belief path p(t).
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where there is no firm heterogeneity and workers can take at most two types. Since our first
price auction limits to the Bertrand competition when there is no asymmetry of information,
every time there is an auction, the wage gets driven up to the belief about the worker at
the point of auction.
Due to the Bertrand competition, the value of a H worker to a firm is discounted by rate
λ, arrival of a poacher. The profit the firm can obtain by keeping the worker is
αY
.
r+λ
Therefore, starting from the initial belief p about the worker’s type, the value of the worker
is
Z
αp

∞

e−(α+λ+r)t [Y +

0

αY
] dt
r+λ

which can be decomposed into the use value of the worker when the worker actually generates a breakthrough before a poacher arrives (y term) and the continuation value starting
from the breakthrough,

αY
r+λ ,

appropriately discounted taking into account transition and

poaching rate. The value can be extended to be

αp

Y
1
αY 
αpY
+
=
α+λ+r α+λ+rr+λ
r+λ

Therefore, we expect that, everytime a worker with no breakthrough shifts a job, to receive
αY
the future value p r+λ
at that time, and the wage to drive up to the marginal productivity
αY
r+λ

with the arrival of a breakthrough.

From this example, it is worth noting that the worker who has generated a news does benefit
from making the news public. While it has negative consequences for bad workers because
their wage deterministically drifts down along with the belief. In our model example of two
worker types, the wage is almost perfectly informative about the worker’s type because any
wage increase by retention is a perfect signal that the worker is a High type.
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This sheds light onto the recent California legislature which bans firms from inquiring
about the worker’s past wage history. The legislature was introduced on the grounds that
the worker quickly loses bargaining power once the wage information is revealed, especially
for the workers who were receiving wage that are below average/expectation to the new
employer. According to our model, the high type workers who have generated the good
news would still want to credibly convey the wage information to the new firm, while
the low type workers would want to hide the information. Along with consideration for
pooling/what the firms can infer from declined report, the model tells us what the effect
would be if the ban is to be strictly enforced to preclude all wage information. Furthermore,
we expect our main mechanism to go through if there is small chance that high type workers
would also like to hide their information about their wage history, because if the current
wage is not a favorable signal to the worker’s type, the worker benefits by hiding it rather
than disclosing it.
It should be noted, however, that this exercise is only a benchmark. A limitation is that
I assumed short-lived firms. If firms internalize the informational content of the wage in
future auctions, the element would alter the firms’ bidding strategy. However, restricting to
a perfect news benchmark is not a large deviation from the policy exercise. In the perfect
good news output, as I describe here, a poacher would immediately tell that a worker is
H type if the worker received a promotion in the current firm. If the poacher sees that a
worker did not receive a promotion, then the poacher is more pessimistic about the worker’s
quality.
1.5.3. Role of the Firm’s Commitment
In this section, I explore the role of firm’s commitment in driving the main mechanism of
the model. This can serve both as a robustness check for the main results, or serve as the
gauge for the genericity of the model in terms of capturing different real world dynamics.
For instance, if we consider an object that is open for appraisal, such as real-estate property,
it is more natural to think that the good assets trade faster, while the less attractive ones
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stay in the market. In the relevant paper, Kaya and Kim (2018) shows how the trading
dynamics would flip if we take into account these ‘appraisal’ possibility.
We construct a realistic example with drastically different results. Assume that the firms
instead learn by ‘bad news’. That is, instead of assuming that α accompanies the lump-sum
produce of Y , think of it as accompanying a lump-sum deficit −Y , which makes it inefficient
for the firm to retain the worker afterwards. Assume that a worker with no news generates
flow profit of b > 0 to the firm. Expected flow profit of the H worker is b > 0, while for L
worker, it is b − αY ≤ 0.
The match starts with prior belief p0 and drifts according to the equation
p0 (t) = αp(t)(1 − p(t)),

p(t) =

p0 eαt
.
p0 eαt + (1 − p0 )

Since the bad news worker is not kept in this firm, both the poacher and the incumbent
agree that a worker with tenure t is likely to be H type with probability p(t). Opportunity
for the poacher to ‘appraise’ the good, or to ‘interview’ a worker will make the poacher
better informed than the incumbent.
Definition 5. With an ‘interview’, the poacher privately observes the news generated by
the worker for next T duration of time.
We assume that the news process the interviewer observes is the same as the bad news
breakthrough process that they see as an employer. The result still goes through for other
types of news process, such as perfect good news process, or any other imperfect news.
Assuming bad news process, from the incumbent’s point of view, the poacher’s belief about
the worker takes at most two points:



p̃ =


0

p(t)
p(t)+(1−p(t))e−αT

> p(t)

if no bad news, probability x(t)
if bad news, probability 1 − x(t)

where, according to the definition of interview: x(t) = p(t) + (1 − p(t))e−αT and 1 − x(t) =
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(1 − p(t))(1 − e−αT ). This is exactly the mirror case of the main model, where now we let
x(t) be the probability that the incumbent attaches to the event that there were no bad news
observed in the interview. Effectively, the incumbent now has to worry about overpaying
for the worker who the poacher identified as unproductive.
In the replacement case (Example 2), the support of the bids is the interval [0, p(t)], where
the poacher with no bad news (P 0) wins with probability 1 − 12 x(t) = 1 − 21 p(t) + (1 −

p(t))e−αT and bids to make incumbent firm (I∅) satisfy zero-profit, indifference condition:
(assume that the incumbent firm’s bid is disclosed)

0=

xp̃GP 0 (v) + (1 − x) · 0 αY
−v
xGP 0 (v) + (1 − x) r + λ

Since the probability of winning is 1 at the upper bound of the support, v̄, we pin down the
upper bound:
v̄ = (xp̃ + (1 − x) · 0)

αY
αY
= p(t)
= Π(p(t)).
r+λ
r+λ

Poacher with bad news (P L) wins with zero probability, while the incumbent firm (I∅) bids
in order to make P 0 bidder indifferent:

GI∅ (v) =

αY
(p̃ − p(t)) r+λ
Π(p̃) − Π(p(t))
=
αY
Π(p̃) − v
p̃ r+λ
−v



αY
over v ∈ 0, p(t)
.
r+λ

Since only a no bad news poacher, P 0, makes non-trivial bid, successful poaching drives
up belief to p̃ from p(t). If the incumbent succeeded in retaining the worker, due to the
interview, the poacher might have been type P L who saw bad news about the worker.
Every time the worker is retained with bid v, belief jumps down taking into account the
adverse selection:
p(h(t)) =

xp̃GP 0 (v) + (1 − x) · 0
< p(t).
xGP 0 (v) + (1 − x)
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1.6. Conclusion
This paper focuses on the relationship between the wage profile and the job-to-job transition
of a worker, by exploring the interaction between the micro-auction game and the macrolabor model. I incorporate learning and information friction into the traditional model of
on-the-job search, and show that asymmetry of information can generate high job transition
rate for low type workers, and low job transition for high type workers. This finding is
consistent with data which shows that escape from a bad match is a more likely cause of
job transition than worker search alone. Using the results from the literature on auctions,
I characterize the auction equilibrium in the dynamic setting, and analyse the effect of
information policy. I show that hiding a worker’s wage history helps low type workers,
while it might have a negative consequence of hurting high type workers. At the same time,
a worker may on average be worse off when the law switches off learning from wage history.
The model shows that the interaction between a well-informed incumbent and less-informed
poacher results in positive signal on worker quality as a worker’s tenure grows. Depending
on the industry, this might not be a case. If a worker’s performance is public, or if the firm
lacks commitment to keep a bad worker, it is possible that a longer tenure convey negative
signal about quality. I hope this discussion can shed light to different connotations to job
transitions attached in various industries.

1.7. Appendix to Chapter 1
1.7.1. Good News Drift
Starting from initial probability p(t) ∈ [0, 1], the probability that no news arrives in dt
interval is given by:

P (H)P r(no news|H) + P (L)P r(no news|L) = p(t)(1 − αdt) + (1 − p(t)).
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Applying Bayes rule, p(t + dt) is given by:

p(t + dt) =

p(t)(1 − αdt)
.
p(t)(1 − αdt) + (1 − p(t))

Subtracting p(t) from both sides:
p(t)(1 − p(t))(1 − αdt) − p(t)(1 − p(t))
p(t)(1 − αdt) + (1 − p(t))
p(t)(1 − p(t))(−αdt)
=
.
p(t)(1 − αdt) + (1 − p(t))

p(t + dt) − p(t) =

Dividing both sides by dt and taking limit dt → 0,
p0 (t) = −αp(t)(1 − p(t)).

In general, this is true even if match dissolves with some positive rate, as long as the rate
for H and L types are identical. Starting from any p0 = p(t), and using the Bayes’ rule,
the belief after dt is given by

p(t + dt) =

p(t + dt) − p(t) =

p(t)(1 − rdt − αdt − λdt)
p(t)(1 − rdt − αdt − λdt) + (1 − p(t))(1 − rdt − λdt)
p(t)(1 − p(t))(1 − rdt − αdt − λdt) − p(t)(1 − p(t))(1 − λdt)
p(t)(1 − rdt − αdt − λdt) + (1 − p(t))(1 − rdt − λdt)
p0 (t) = −αp(t)(1 − p(t)),

p(0) = p0

This is true as long as both the high and low types leave at the same rate λ.
1.7.2. Results from Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. (1983)
Definition 6. Z is the value of the object, X is the private signal of an informed bidder,
U is an independent uniform random variable on [0, 1]. Let H = E[Z|X].
Definition 7. Define the informed bidder’s distributional type be T = T (H, U ), uniformly
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distributed on [0, 1], where

T (h, u) = P r({H < h, or H = h and U < u}).

Let
H(t) = inf{h|P (H ≤ h) > t}
to have H = H(T ) almost surely.
We solve for the equilibrium strategies β : [0, 1] → R+ for the informed bidder, and the bid
distribution G for uninformed bidder.
Proposition 10 (Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. (1983)). The equilibrium bid distribution β
of the informed bidder is,

β(t) = E[H(T )|T ≤ t] =

1
t

Z

t

H(s)ds
0

with β(0) = H(0), and β(1) = E[H].
The equilibrium bid distribution G of the uninformed bidder is

G(b) = P r(β(T ) ≤ b).

Proof. Suppose the informed bidder type is T = t. If he bids β(τ ), then he wins with
probability τ , yielding an expected payoff
Z

τ

[H(t) − β(τ )]τ =

(H(t) − H(s)) ds
0

which is maximized at τ = t.
For any uninformed bidder, any bid below H(0) yields zero payoff, while bid greater than
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E[H] generates negative payoff. Consider a bid b = β(t). Its expected payoff is

E[Z − β(t)|T ≤ t]t

However, E[Z − β(t)|T ≤ t] = E[H(T )|T ≤ t] − β(t) = 0.

Applying the results to our environment, we get the distribution

H(t) =




ΠI0

t≤1−x



ΠIh

t>1−x

which implies



ΠI0 , t ≤ 1 − x
1 t
H(s) ds =
β(t) =


t 0

 1 (1 − x)ΠI0 + (t − (1 − x))ΠIh ),
t
Z

t>1−x

1.7.3. Common Value Auction: A Constructive Proof
In this Appendix, we show that in equilibrium:
• I0 submits degenerate bid ΠI0 . Ih and P ∅ submit randomized bids over support
[ΠI0 , Π̃], where Π̃ = xΠIh + (1 − x)ΠI0 .
• Bidding distributions for the three players are

GIh (b) =

GP ∅ (b) =

1 − x b − ΠI0
x Ṽ − b

(1 − x)(ΠIh − ΠI0 )
(ΠIh − b)

GI0 is degenerate at ΠI0 .
Claim 1. There does not exist a pure strategy NE of this auction game.

42

Proof. The value of the object at sale is at least ΠI0 .
Any bid b < ΠI0 is not played in equilibrium because any opponent player can make
profitable deviation to b0 with b < b0 < ΠI0 .
Suppose bidder P ∅ always bids b = ΠI0 . Then bidder 1H has profitable deviation for any
bid b0 > ΠI0 , from which he can bid slightly less, b0 > b00 > ΠI0 .
Suppose bidder P ∅ bids ΠI0 < b ≤ xΠIh + (1 − x)ΠI0 . Bidder Ih’s best response is to bid
slightly above b and win for sure. In which case, the bidder 2 expects to gain negative profit
ΠI0 − b < 0, and would rather get 0 payoff by bidding ΠI0 .
The bidder P ∅ never bids above xΠIh + (1 − x)ΠI0 in equilbrium. Since bidder I0’s best
response to b > ΠI0 of bidder P ∅ is to bid below b, bidder P ∅ always wins over I0 in
equilibrium. Hence his maximum willingness to pay for the object is xΠIh + (1 − x)ΠI0 .
Therefore, if there is an equilibrium, it has to be in mixed strategies, the support is given
by the following claim.
Claim 2. In equilibrium, bidder P ∅’s bid distribution GP ∅ is continuous and strictly increasing over (ΠI0 , xΠIh + (1 − x)ΠI0 ].
Proof. First, note that given the candidate bidder P ∅’s strategy, bidder I0 never puts
positive probability on bids above ΠI0 . Therefore, the strategy is best response to bidder
Ih’s. Furthermore, Ih and P ∅ shares the same support. We can also rule out any atom
in the interior of the support, otherwise there is profitable deviation. We can also rule out
GP ∅ having atom at Π̃ because Ih would deviate.
In equilibrium, Ih and P ∅ mixes over bids to make the opponent indifferent over all bids
on the support. That is, GIh solves:

xGIh (b)(ΠIh − b) + (1 − x)(ΠI0 − b) = 0
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and GP ∅ solves:

GP ∅ (b)(ΠIh − b) = (ΠIh − Π̃) = (1 − x)(ΠIh − ΠI0 ).

When ties are resolved with the toss of a fair coin, the winning probabilities are:



1


2 x + (1 − x)



1

2 (1 − x)






1

for Ih
for I0
for P ∅

2

Conditional on type realizations, Ih or I0, probability that bidder P ∅ wins is
1
P r(P ∅ wins|Ih) = x,
2

1
P r(P ∅ wins|I0) = x + (1 − x)
2

That is, bidder P ∅’s expected payment is
1
1 2
x ΠIh + (x(1 − x) + (1 − x)2 )ΠI0
2
2
Bidder Ih expects to pay
1
xΠIh + (1 − x)ΠI0
2
Bidder I0:

1
2 (1

− x)ΠI0 .

1.7.4. Proposition 2: Derivation of Equilibrium Conditions
Beliefs

Time t stands for tenure in the firm. The differential equation is obtained using

Bayes rule:

x(t) 1 − λdt + λdtP r(Ih wins|t) + (1 − x(t))p(t)αdt

x(t + dt) =
x(t) 1 − λdt + λdtP r(Ih wins|t) + (1 − x(t))(1 − λdt + λdtP r(I0 wins|t))
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where, given the bid distributions at time t,
Z
P r(Ih wins|t) =

GP ∅ (v|t) dGIh (v|t).

We assume that in case of a tie, the worker shifts to P ∅. In this case, P r(I0 wins|t) is 0,
and


x(t)(1 − x(t)) 1 − λdt + λdtP r(Ih wins|t) + (1 − x(t))(p(t)αdt − x(t)(1 − λdt)

x(t+dt)−x(t) =
x(t) 1 − λdt + λdtP r(Ih wins|t) + (1 − x(t))(1 − λdt)
Dividing by dt and taking dt → 0:
x0 (t) = λP r(Ih wins|t)x(t)(1 − x(t)) + α(1 − x(t))p(t)
|
{z
} |
{z
}
(1)

(2)

Note that the differential rate at which I wins affects the drift of the belief x. Intuitively,
when the I0 workers are leaving with probability 1, staying at this firm is a partial good
news about the worker’s type, which is reflected in the drift component in (1). The second
component, (2), is additional breakthrough flowing from 1 − x(t) to x(t) pool.
Values

It is informative to look at the recursion of the value equations in the discrete

time:
Z
ΠIh (t) = Y αdt+(1−rdt−λdt)ΠIh (t+dt)+λdt

(ΠIh (t+dt)−v)GP ∅ (v|t+dt)dGIh (v|t+dt)

where the recursive expression ΠIh (t + dt) takes into account the the location of the future
beliefs, which is taken as exogenous by the firm at the time of auction.
Since the highest bid V̄ (t) wins the auction game for sure, substituting the indifference
condition:

ΠIh (t) = Y αdt + (1 − rdt − λdt)ΠIh (t + dt) + λdt(ΠIh (t + dt) − V̄ (t))
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Subtracting both sides by ΠIh (t) and dividing by dt:
0 = αY + Π0Ih (t) − (r + λ)ΠIh (t) + λ(ΠIh (t) − V̄ (t)).

(1h’)

Since this holds for any t, integrating it for [s, ∞) after mutiplying by e−(r+λ)t yields
αY −(r+λ)s
0=
e
− e−(r+λ)t ΠIh (t) +
r+λ

Z

∞

e−(r+λ)s (ΠIh (s) − V̄ (s)) ds.

t

Similarly, for ΠI0 , the value it derives are from expected value of transition to state ΠIh ,

ΠI0 (t) = (1 − r dt − λdt − αp(t)dt)ΠI0 (t + dt) + αp(t) dtΠIh (t + dt),
0 = Π0I0 (t) − (r + λ + αp(t))ΠI0 (t) + αp(t)ΠIh (t)

(I0)

1.7.5. Section 1.3: Expected Flow Value I0
Normalize all the expressions so that the starting period t is 0. First note that ΠI0 starting
from initial belief p̃(0), by a direct integration of I0, is given by:
Z
ΠI0 (0) =

∞

e−

Rs
0

(r+λ+αp̃(z))dz



αp̃(s) Y + ΠIh (s) ds,

0

where ΠIh (s) is the value after learning the type of the worker, evaluated over the Bayes
rational belief path starting from p̃(0). We note that ΠI0 is the expected future value from
transition to the learned state ΠIh and the lump-sum payoff Y that arrives at rate α in case
the worker is indeed High quality.
Due to our good news learning assumption, the rate of transition at tenure τ , αp̃(τ ), and
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the evolution of p̃(τ ) exactly cancels out in the integral:
αp̃(s)e−

Rs
0

αp̃(z) dz

= αp̃(s)e−αs+

Rs

−αs−

Rs

= αp̃(s)e

= αp̃(s)e−αs

0

α(1−p̃(z)) dz

p̃0 (z)
0 p̃(z)

dz

p̃(0)
= αp̃(0)e−αs
p̃(s)

Therefore, the expression can be simplified to:
Z
ΠI0 (0) = αp̃(0)

∞



e−(r+λ+α)s Y + ΠIh (s) ds.

0

Intuitively, Π0 is the expected value of transition to Π1 at rate α, with effective discount
rate λ + r, coming from the dissolution of the match at rate λ. The good news drift allows
us to replace the effect from change in transition rate over time, αp̃(s), with the initial
probability p̃(0) and constant rate of transition α.
1.7.6. Section 1.4.1: Case 1 Equilibrium Auction Outcomes
Using the indifference condition, GP ∅ is given by:

GP ∅ (v) =

αY
(1 − x)(1 − p) r+λ
Π1 − ΠI0 (x + (1 − x)p)
=
αY
Π1 − v
r+λ − v

αY
.
with atom 1 − x at the lower bound, p r+λ

Again, using the indifference condition, GIh is given by:

GIh (v) =


1 − x 1 − p
−
1
x
1 − v r+λ
αY

Since the value is a linear transformation of a belief, it is convenient to convert the v
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variables into corresponding beliefs p̃ =

G̃Ih (p̃) = GIh (p̃

r+λ
αY v.

Define the bid distributions G̃Ih and G̃P ∅ as


αY
1 − x1 − p
) = G̃Ih (p̃) =
−1 ,
r+λ
x
1 − p̃

G̃P ∅ (p̃) = GP ∅ (p̃

αY
(1 − x)(1 − p)
)=
.
r+λ
(1 − p̃)

for p̃ ∈ [p, x + (1 − x)p].
The probability that the Ih type wins over P ∅ is given by:
Z

x+(1−x)p

Z

x+(1−x)p

G̃P ∅ (p̃) dG̃Ih (p̃) =
p

p

The antiderivative of
(1−x)2 (1−p)2
x

1
1
2 (1 − p̃)2

1
(1−p̃)3

being

1
,
2(1−p̃)2

(1 − x)(1 − p) 1 − x (1 − p)
dp̃
1 − p̃
x (1 − p̃)2

the definite integral that is to be multiplied by

is

x+(1−x)p

=

p

 1  1 − (1 − x)2  1
1
1
x(2 − x)
1
−
=
=
.
2 (1 − x)2 (1 − p)2 (1 − p)2
2 (1 − x)2 (1 − p)2
2 (1 − x)2 (1 − p)2

In the end, the probability is 12 (2 − x) = 1 − 21 x.
1.7.7. Solution for x in Case 2
Using
t

Z

−λs

e
0

−αs

αe

Z t
α
ds =
(α + λ)e−(α+λ)s ds
α+λ 0

α 
=
1 − e−(α+λ)t ,
α+λ

Starting from initial belief p0 and x(0) = 0, x is given by

x(t) =
=

p0
p0

Rt
0

e−(r+λ)s d(1 −

Rt

−(r+λ)s d(1 − e−αs )
0 e
e−αs ) + p0 e−(r+α+λ)t +

(1 − p0 )e−(r+λ)t

α
p0 α+λ
(1 − e−(α+λ)t )
α
p0 α+λ
(1 − e−(α+λ)t ) + e−λt (p0 e−αt + (1 − p0 ))
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Intuitively, only the subset of good workers who received good news (with probability 1 −
e−αs within duration s) before the first poaching attempt, are the revealed good workers in
this firm. It is easily seen in the expression

α
α+λ

that the order of arrival of two independent

Poisson processes, rates α and λ, matter for the numerator. The denominator represents
the probability of survival in this firm for the duration of t, either by the arrival of news,
or no poaching attempt (e−λt ).
To verify that the solution to the ODE is indeed as above, we check our algebra by plugging
in the expression for x into the differential equation:
x0 (t) =

α
p0 αe−(α+λ)t p0 α+λ (1 − e−(α+λ)t )A0 (t)
−
,
A(t)
A(t)2

where
A(t) = p0

α
(1 − e−(α+λ)t ) + e−λt (p0 e−αt + (1 − p0 )),
α+λ

and
A0 (t) = p0 αe−(α+λ)t − p0 (α + λ)e−(α+λ)t − λ(1 − p0 )e−λt
= −λp0 e−(α+λ)t − λ(1 − p0 )e−λt .

Meanwhile,
1 − x(t) =

p0 e−(α+λ)t + (1 − p0 )e−λt
,
A(t)

hence,
α
p0 α+λ
(1 − e−(α+λ)t )(−λ)
x0 (t)
p0 αe−(α+λ)t
=
−
1 − x(t)
A(t)
p0 e−(α+λ)t + (1 − p0 )e−λt

= αp(t) + λx(t)
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1.7.8. Proof of Proposition 7
Define
D(t) = ΠIh (t) − ΠI0 (t).
Subtract the equations in the system to yield the following ODE in terms of D only:
−D0 (t) + (r + λ)D(t) = α(1 − p(t))Y + (λ(1 − x(t)) − αp(t))D(t)
−D0 (t) + (r + λx(t) + αp(t))D(t) = α(1 − p(t))Y
Use the drift equation to substitute λx(t) + αp(t) with
−D0 (t) + (r +

Since

x0 (t)
1−x(t)

=

d
dt (− log(1

x0 (t)
1−x(t) :

x0 (t)
)D(t) = α(1 − p(t))Y
1 − x(t)

− x(t))), we have

exp(−rt + log(1 − x(t))) = exp(−rt)(1 − x(t))

multiplying by this number,
−e−rt (1 − x(t))D0 (t) + (re−rt (1 − x(t)) + e−rt x0 (t))D(t) = αe−rt (1 − x(t))(1 − p(t))Y

which can be rearranged by

−

d −rt
e (1 − x(t))D(t) = e−rt (1 − x(t))(1 − p(t))αY
dt

Integrating from t to infinity, noting that D and x are bounded:

e

−rt

Z
(1 − x(t))D(t) =

∞

e−rs (1 − x(s))(1 − p(s))αY ds

t
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Plugging this information into (Ih0 ):
−Π0Ih (t) + (r + λ)ΠIh (t) = αY + λ(1 − x(t))(ΠIh (t) − ΠI0 (t))

(Ih’)

−e−(r+λ)t Π0Ih (t) + (r + λ)e−(r+λ)t ΠIh (t) = αY e−(r+λ)t + λe−(r+λ)t (1 − x(t))(ΠIh (t) − ΠI0 (t))

d
− e−(r+λ)t ΠIh (t) = αY e−(r+λ)t + λe−λt e−rt (1 − x(t))D(t)
dt
Z
∞

= αY e−(r+λ)t + λe−λt

e−rs (1 − x(s))(1 − p(s))αY ds

t

Integrating over [t, ∞):
−(r+λ)t

e

αY −(r+λ)t
ΠIh (t) =
e
+λ
r+λ

Z

∞

−λs

Z

e
t

∞

e−rz (1 − x(z))(1 − p(z))αY dz ds

s

Changing the order of integration
−(r+λ)t

e

αY −(r+λ)t
e
+
ΠIh (t) =
r+λ

Z

∞


e−λt − e−λz e−rz (1 − x(z))(1 − p(z))αY dz

t

Multiplying by e(r+λ)t
αY
ΠIh (t) =
+
r+λ

Z

∞


e−r(z−t) − e−(r+λ)(z−t) (1 − x(z))(1 − p(z))αY dz

t

Use this to back out the x(t)ΠIh (t) + (1 − x(t))ΠI0 (t) = ΠIh (t) − (1 − x(t))D(t):

ΠIh (t) − (1 − x(t))D(t)
Z ∞

αY
=
+
1 − e−λ(z−t) e−r(z−t) (1 − x(z))(1 − p(z))αY dz
r+λ
t
Z ∞
−
e−r(s−t) (1 − x(s))(1 − p(s))αY ds
t
Z ∞
αY
=
−
e−(r+λ)(z−t) (1 − x(z))(1 − p(z))αY dz
r+λ
t
Z ∞


= αY
e−(r+λ)(z−t) x(z) + (1 − x(z))p(z) dz
t
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1.7.9. Proposition 8: Properties of Value Functions
Expression for x̃

Denote by C(t), the maximum cost in order for the incumbent to retain

the worker:
Z
C(t) = αY

∞


e−(r+λ)(s−t) x(s) + (1 − x(s))p(s) ds

t

Closed form for the x(s) + (1 − x(s))p(s) := x̃(s):


α
p0 α+λ
1 − e−(α+λ)t + p0 e−(α+λ)t




x̃(t) =
α
p0 α+λ
1 − e−(α+λ)t + e−λt p0 e−αt + (1 − p0 )
normalizing by p0 :

1 − e−(α+λ)t + e−(α+λ)t




x̃(t) =
α
−(α+λ)t + e−λt e−αt + 1−p0
1
−
e
α+λ
p0
α
α+λ

=



λ
α
−(α+λ)t
α+λ + α+λ e
α
λ
−(α+λ)t + 1−p0 e−λt
α+λ + α+λ e
p0

Lemma 1.
∂ x̃
> 0.
∂λ
Proof. The result follows from the property of x. Suppose there are two paths of x’s, which
I denote as x1 and x2 for parameters λ1 < λ2 , starting from the same p0 . For t close to 0,
x2 (t) > x1 (t) and the inequality should not flip because if so, there is an intersection and
at the intersection, x = x2 = x1 , we have x02 > x01 .
Therefore, an increase in λ increases x and x̃ = x + (1 − x)p.
Lemma 2.
∂ x̃
> 0.
∂α
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Proof. From the last expression for x̃, focus on the term
α
λ
+
e−(α+λ)t := A
α+λ α+λ
which I denote A. Its derivative with respect to α is given by:
λe−(α+λ)t (α + λ)t − e(α+λ)t + 1
(−1)
(α + λ)2



It is immediately shown that 1 + (α + λ)t − e−(α+λ)t < 0 and the result follows.

Expression for ΠIh

From

ΠIh (t) =

αY
−λ
r

Z

∞

e−r(z−t) C(z) dz,

t

we have

ΠIh (t) =
=

αY
r
αY
r
αY
r
αY
r

Z
− λ(αY )

∞

−r(z−t)

e
t
Z ∞Z

− λ(αY )

Z

∞

e−r(s−z) x̃(s) ds dz

z
s

e

−r(z−t) −r(s−z) −λ(s−z)

e
e
x̃(s) dz ds
Z ∞
Z s
−r(s−t)
=
− λ(αY )
e
x̃(s)
e−λ(s−z) dz ds
t
t
Z ∞
1

=
− λ(αY )
e−r(s−t) x̃(s) (1 − e−λ(s−t) ) ds
λ
t
Z ∞


= αY
e−r(s−t) 1 − x̃(s)(1 − e−λ(s−t) ) ds
t

t

t

Last line by changing the order of integration. From the expression, it is immediate that
Proposition 11. Suppose αY is a constant. Then, an increase in α decreases ΠIh (t).
Proposition 12. An increase in λ increases x̃ and (1 − e−λs ). Overall, decreases the term.
Expression for ΠI0

Let’s turn to ΠI0 . Starting from p0 , the value is
Z
αp0

∞

h
i
e−(α+λ+r)t Y + ΠIh (t) dt

0
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Expanding
Y
+ αp0
αp0
+ λ + r}
| α {z
|

∞

Z

e

−(α+λ+r)t

Z

∞

t

0

(1)



e−r(s−t) 1 − x̃(s)(1 − e−λ(s−t) ) ds dt (αY )
{z
}
(2)

Let r = 0 and αY = 1 for simplicity, and focus on the second term, (2):
∞

Z

−(α+λ)t

Z

e

αp0

∞


1 − x̃(s)(1 − e−λ(s−t) ) ds dt

t

0

Changing the order of integration:
Z

∞Z s



e−(α+λ)t 1 − x̃(s)(1 − e−λ(s−t) ) dt ds
0
0
Z ∞
Z s
Z ∞Z
−(α+λ)t
= αp0
e
(1 − x̃(s)) dt dt + αp0

αp0

0

0

0

s

e−αt x̃(s)e−λs dt ds

0

The first part:
Z
αp0
0

∞


1 
1 − e−(α+λ)s (1 − x̃(s)) ds
α+λ

The second part:
∞Z s

Z
αp0
0

e−αt x̃(s)e−λs dt ds = αp0

Z

0

0

∞

1
(1 − e−αs )x̃(s)e−λs ds
α

Overall,
p0
+ p0
+ λ}
|α {z
|
(1)

Z
0

∞


α 
1 − e−(α+λ)s (1 − x̃(s)) ds + p0
α+λ
{z
(2)

Z
0

∞

(1 − e−αs )x̃(s)e−λs ds
}

Expanding (2):
∞

Z
p0
0

α
α
(1 − e−(α+λ)s ) − x̃(s)
(1 − e−(α+λ)s ) − x̃(s)e−(α+λ)s + x̃(s)e−λs ds
α+λ
α+λ

Z
p0
0

∞

α
α
λ
(1 − e−(α+λ)s ) − x̃(s)
−
x̃(s)e−(α+λ)s + x̃(s)e−λs ds
α+λ
α+λ α+λ
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Z
p0
0

∞

α
λ
−λs
ds
(1 − x̃(s)) +
e−(α+λ)s (1 − x̃(s)) − e|−(α+λ)s
{z } +x̃(s)e
α+λ
α+λ
(∗)

The underbraced term (∗) cancels out with (1). Therefore, the expression is:
Z
p0
0

∞


α
λ
+
e−(α+λ)s (1 − x̃(s)) + x̃(s)e−λs ds
α+λ α+λ

To see how this increases with α, let
λ
α
+
e−(α+λ)s
α+λ α+λ

A(α) =

and let
B=

1 − p0 −λs
e .
p0

It follows immediately that
x̃(s) =

A
.
A+B

Rewrite the above expression in terms of A and B:
Z
p0

∞

A

A
B 
p0
+
B ds
A+B
A + B 1 − p0



0

∞

A  1 
B ds
A + B 1 − p0

Z

∞

Z
p0
0

Overall,
0

A
e−λs ds
A+B

Note that p0 affects the expression only through B. Increase in p0 decreases B, and increases
the expression. Therefore, I show increment in α and p0 .
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CHAPTER 2 : Ranking and Search Effort in Matching (joint with Hanna Wang)
2.1. Introduction
Mismatch in markets with simultaneous applications is a widely-studied phenomenon. The
macroeconomic search literature, following the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides framework,
typically represents matching friction using a matching function which maps market tightness into a number of matches. The number of matches is always smaller than the number
of vacancies or unemployed workers - the idea is simple: without coordination many workers apply to the same firms while other firms do not receive any applications, resulting in
unemployment and unfilled vacancies.
The extent of this miscoordination affects the success probability of applications and workers’ incentives to search for jobs. Dating back to Stigler (1962), many papers have noted
the importance of endogenous search effort for labor market outcomes, namely it allows
sampling better wage offers and increases the probability of finding any job. This paper
considers the latter effect for workers commonly ranked by employers and choose a number
of applications to send out with the goal of securing a job.
A range of papers have examined this problem for identical agents, e.g. Albrecht et al. (2003)
and Kircher (2009), but to our best knowledge this is the first paper to study endogenous
simultaneous search effort of heterogeneous agents. Workers within the same applicant pool
might be favored differently by firms and face different incentives in the application process.
A natural question is how this differentiation translates into differences in search intensity
and matching outcome.
The source of heterogeneity in our model is workers’ endowment of a characteristic over
which employers have common preferences but cannot contract. Each employer offers the
same wage to all workers and is not able to discriminate between workers by posting typespecific wage schedules but only by selecting a preferable applicant. This assumption follows
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Peters (2010) and has the effect that differences in worker incentives are driven only by rank
competition instead of employers’ wage-posting.
Due to fixed wages workers cannot distinguish among vacancies evade others by directing
applications to specific firms, intensifying competition across types. While this assumption
is restrictive, it is true for some labor markets and potentially applies to many others to a
certain extent. One example which we will use throughout the main part of this paper is the
market for new public school teachers. Salaries and work conditions are negotiated by unions
at district level and as noted by Boyd et al. (2013), who estimate an empirical matching
model for the teaching market, the majority of teachers find employment in close proximity
to where they grew up. Because salaries are only conditioned on years of experience and
education, the variation for entry level positions conditional on education is minimal. This
warrants the assumption of fixed wages within the local labor market. The authors find that
schools have strong preferences over the selectivity of teachers’ colleges and performance in
a basic knowledge test. It is reasonable to assume the distribution of these qualifications
are public knowledge, such that a public common ranking of candidates is justified.
One caveat are that teachers might have common preferences over schools’ non-wage attributes, too. We argue, however, that these should be much more random. Boyd et al.
(2013) find that all teachers prefer schools with a smaller fraction of poor students, but
they also show teachers have strong preferences for schools that are close to the location
where they grew up and preferences for racial composition of the student body depends on
own race. Furthermore, it is conceivable teacher might prefer schools based on other privately known factors such as proximity to spouses’ families, whether they attended a school
themselves, friends or family members working at the school etc. This should substantially
limit the ability of newly graduated teachers to predict the popularity of schools and the
skill level of respective competing applicants.
This examples extends readily to other parts of the public sector or markets with unionized
wages. Another way to interpret our setting is that the worker characteristic cannot be
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priced because the value is difficult to quantify (e.g. for soft skills or reference letters) or
that it is not legal to discriminate based on it (e.g. race, sex, motherhood status or physical
attractiveness). One other possibility are individuals with similar qualifications applying to
a tier of employers/institutions such that payoffs are uniform e.g. consulting job for college
graduates from top universities with grades within a certain range or college applications
to Ivy League Universities. We discuss a few applications in more details in Section 6.
The effect of rank on the number of applications is not obvious. Two opposing forces come
to mind when we compare a low-rank to a high-rank worker’s incentives. On the one hand,
because success probability per application decreases with rank (which follows immediately
from our model) and applications are costly, the low-rank worker might be discouraged from
applying as often as the high-rank worker. On the other hand, the low-rank worker might
want to send out additional applications as a form of insurance, because applications are
more likely to fail.
Using our model we show that the relationship between rank and search effort is humpshaped. That is it decreases with rank for workers above a certain threshold, while the
reverse is true for workers below the threshold. As Shimer (2004) pointed out, traditional
search models (e.g. Pissarides (2000)) generate the result that equilibrium search effort has
to increase in the baseline arrival rate1 . This would suggest that higher-rank workers search
more given that they are favored over other workers. In contrast, we find that this is only
true for workers which rank below the threshold.
Our result implies that above the threshold rank, lower-rank workers can gain on, if not
overtake, higher-rank workers in terms of employment probability, because they counteract
a lower per-application success rate with sending more applications. However, below the
threshold, employment chance rapidly decreases for lower-rank workers because they both
face an even lower per-application success rate and send out fewer applications than higher1

The arrival rate denotes the stochastic probability with which a worker receives a job offer in a given
period. Search effort is often modeled as choosing a scaling parameter that is multiplied by the baseline
rate.
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ranked competitors.
In past literature, heterogeneous searchers have mostly been studied with fixed search effort
and directed search, such as in Peters (2010), Shimer (2005), Shi (2002), Burdett and Coles
(1997). One exception is Lentz (2010) who finds a monotone relationship between sequential
search effort and worker type in his search model, confirming Shimer’s (2004) prediction
discussed earlier. In contrast to our goal of examining worker heterogeneity, past papers
which model endogenous simultaneous search effort consider heterogeneity on the firm side,
studying the role of wage dispersion and directed search for efficiency (e.g Albrecht et al.
(2003), Galenianos and Kircher (2009), Kircher (2009)).
By relaxing the assumption of fixed wages and allowing employers to set different wages
workers might tend to sort and more skilled workers exert more effort, possibly leading
to a different application and matching pattern than our result predicts. Nevertheless, our
model still offers insights on search effort whenever unequal searchers are in somewhat direct
competition with one another and incur frictions due to the lack of ability to exactly predict
the applicant skill level at each location.
Simultaneous endogenous search lets workers choose a number of applications to send out at
the same time. Modelling this is a challenging task because firms’ and workers’ actions are
interdependent and characterizing employment probabilities involves cumbersome combinatorics. In particular, a worker only gets hired by a particular firm if that firm does not hire
a different worker, which in turn depends on whether that worker gets hired by another firm
he applied to and so on. To limit the number of strategic interactions arising from many
rounds of offers and acceptances, the majority of papers restrict firms to making a single
offer (e.g. Shimer (2004), Albrecht et al. (2003), Galenianos and Kircher (2009)). We rely
on the assumption that the equilibrium matching is stable to obtain well-defined expressions for employment probability. This concept was first introduced by Kircher (2009) in the
search and matching in context, and has since been adapted by a handful of papers (Gautier
and Holzner (2013, 2016), Wolthoff (2009)). A matching is stable if no firm or worker can
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be strictly better off by matching with a different partner. Contrary to the one-shot offer
settings in which some firms are left with open vacancies, even if they have unemployed
applicants, stable matching effectively implies that workers and firms communicate back
and forth until there are no more mutually beneficial matches left to be made.
In our model, a stable matching requires workers to only be unemployed when all firms they
applied to hire higher-ranked workers. This lets us express the employment probability as a
function of the mass of successfully employed higher-rank workers and derive a differential
equation that characterizes how the latter changes with worker rank.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we illustrate the basic idea using a simple
example. Section 2.3 develops the full theoretical model and presents the main result. In
Section 2.4 we provide an analysis of how market tightness and application costs affect
application behavior and employment outcomes. Lastly, we discuss efficiency and the social
planner solution in Section 2.5.

2.2. A Simple Discrete Example
Consider a labor market with M vacancies, each at a different firm, and three workers,
{A, B, C}, ranked first, second, and third respectively by all firms. The workers decide how
many applications to send to the firms. They apply to each firm at most once and can take
at most one job.
Here, as well as for the full model, we make anonymity assumptions analogous to Kircher
(2009). We assume workers do not know the identity of firms and applications are equivalent
to random sampling of jobs without replacement. So, with m applications, a worker has

M
m ways of sampling firms. Workers also do not know where others apply, and might
apply to the same job as higher-ranked competitors. When offered multiple employment
opportunities, they randomly choose one without consideration for other applicants. This
rules out coordination among workers to direct applications or purposeful selection of firm
offers, e.g. a higher-rank worker chooses to take a specific job over another to leave the
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(B,C)
1
2

1
( 12 , 12 12 + 21 · 0)
(1, 0)

2
( 12 , 12 · 1 + 12 · 0)
(1, 0)

Table 2: Match Probabilities, Two Slots Case
MB
A
B
C (1)
C (2)

1−0
1

2−1
0

1
2
1
4

1
2
1
4

0

0

Table 3: Marginal Benefits of an Application for Two Slots Case
latter job to a lower-rank worker.
Note that worker A sends out at most one application, this application lands a job with
certainty. Worker B however, risks unemployment if he only sends out one application,
since he might apply to the same firm as worker A. By sending two applications he gets a
job with certainty since at least one firm he applies to cannot hire worker A.
For M = 2, worker B applies to the same job as worker A with probability

1
2

if he sends

one application. In this case worker C only gets a job if worker B applies to the same firm
as worker A and if he sends an application to the firm to which worker A and B do not
apply. We can see that each worker only needs information on higher-rank workers in order
to evaluate his own decision. A worker always has priority over lower-rank workers and
applying to the same firms as these workers is not a concern. Fixing worker A’s number of
applications to be one, the following table shows the employment probability of each worker
as a function of the number of applications.
The next table presents the marginal benefit of each additional applications for each worker.
The third row and fourth row show worker C’s marginal benefit when worker B sends out
one or two applications respectively.
As mentioned above, the marginal benefit for worker C is a function of worker B’s applications but not vice versa.
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We denote the flat cost of applications as c. The worker’s expected utility is the probability
of getting a job multiplied by the wage minus the cost of application. So the workers
increase then number of their applications as long as the marginal benefit of the application
exceeds the cost. Setting the wage to one for all jobs, we derive that for application cost
less than

1
2

worker A applies once, worker B applies twice, while worker C does not apply

at all. The pattern of application illustrates our main result: the number of applications
is hump-shaped in rank. Workers of mid-range rank might apply more to insure against
losing against higher-rank competitors while low-rank workers might apply less because too
many jobs are taken by higher-rank workers (due to their priority in rank and high search
effort).

2.3. The Model
Setting We now turn to the full model. We consider a bipartite matching problem of two
sets of continuum of agents: workers W, and firms F. Let W be a unit mass of workers,
indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Each worker is endowed with type x ∈ [0, 1], and we denote workers’
type distribution by F with support [0, 1] and a pdf f . Define X : [0, 1] → [0, 1] which
maps each worker to her type. Then F is induced by X, and Lebesgue measure λ over
W: F (x) := λ({i : X(i) ≤ x}). Let F be a positive mass M (> 0) of firms indexed by
j ∈ [0, M ].
As in our simple example, firms are identical with one vacancy each and we adopt the
same anonymity assumptions as before. We now have large markets and add that firms
cannot distinguish between workers of the same type, however the probability of receiving
two applications from the same type is zero given the continuous type space. We define a
strategy as a function k that maps from X into a discrete number of applications, which in
turn are i.i.d. uniform draws from the firm pool.
We normalize each worker’s value from matching with a firm to one and set the value of
remaining unemployed to zero. A worker incurs a flat cost c for each application he sends.
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We assume a firm’s payoff is equal to the matched worker’s type, or −ε(< 0) if it remains
unmatched. Hence, this implies firms strictly prefer to be matched with any worker than
to remain unmatched. As we show later, worker types exactly correspond to their position
in firm preference rankings which is the only object needed for equilibrium analysis.
Matching Process The application and hiring process begins with all workers simultaneously choosing k ∈ Z+ . Then applications are realized, forming a network with ‘links’
from the worker to the firm pool. Given the network a stable matching, which define in the
following part, is formed.
We define a matching as a function µ: W ∪ F → W ∪ F such that
1. µ(i) = j ∈ F if and only if µ(j) = i ∈ W,
2. If µ(i) 6∈ F, then µ(i) = i,
3. If µ(j) 6∈ W, then µ(j) = j.
For each i ∈ W, and corresponding k(i) applications i sent out in the first stage, define the
set of firms receiving an application from i as B(i) = {j1 , j2 , . . . , jk(i) }. A matching µ in the
second stage is feasible if µ(i) ∈ {i} ∪ B(i) for all i. We require the second stage matching
µ to be feasible, and stable in the following sense.
Definition 8. A feasible matching µ is stable if there is no pair (i, j) with j ∈ B(i) such
that µ(i) = i and either (i) µ(j) = j, or (ii) µ(j) 6= j and X(i) > X(µ(j)).
This is the notion of no blocking pair with both parties strictly better off. For any blocking
pair (i, j) with j ∈ B(i), since workers are indifferent over all firms, it must be µ(i) = i.
Furthermore, j strictly prefers i to his current match µ(j), himself or a worker with type
lower than i.
While technically there can be multiple stable matchings, these matchings all exhibit the
same aggregate measures. This property follows from the continuum agent assumption. In
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particular, the mass of matched workers with ranks within any interval is constant across
these matchings.
Employment Probability We first characterize employment probability by type for a
given number of applications made by each worker. There are 1 − F (x) workers of higher
rank for a type x worker. We define the mass of successful applicants of types higher than
x as A(x), here on referred to as the accumulation function. A(x) takes a deterministic
value at any x due to the continuous type space, i.e. the mass of employed mass of workers
above a certain rank is determined with certainty for any application behavior. Since A(x)
is also the mass of of jobs occupied by higher-rank workers, a worker will only be successful
if he does not apply to any of these jobs. His success probability per application is thus
1−

A(x)
M .

Note that when workers make more than one application, A(x) is not equal to

the mass of firms receiving applications from workers of ranks higher than x. Not all firms
with applications can hire higher-rank workers, since those workers will choose only one of
the available firms they applied to.
Rank x worker’s employment probability given k applications is given by 1 −



A(x)
M

k

, the

probability that he applies to at least one firm that does not hire a higher-rank worker.
Due to the large-market properties, the probabilities that each of the applications succeed
are independent.
Assuming the derivative of f exists everywhere, and f and f 0 are bounded, we establish the
following differential equation:
Proposition 13. The change of the accumulation function in a small neighborhood of x if
all workers within this neighborhood apply k times is given by:



0

−A (x) = f (x) 1 −

A(x)
M

k !

The equation simply states that the change in A at x is equal to the expected mass of type
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x workers that succeeds in finding a job. The right-hand side is positive for k > 0 and
A(x) < M ; in this case the accumulation is strictly decreasing. For a better understanding
of this equation the interested reader might turn to Appendix 2.7.1 in which we provide an
alternative derivation using the per-application success rate ϕ(x) = 1 −

A(x)
M .

We express

it as a function of the effective queue length and success rate of higher-ranked competitors
applying to the same job.
The differential equation does not apply for cutoff types x̄ that have types in any arbitrarily
small neighborhood sending out different numbers of applications. At these types, A(x) is
not differentiable. However, note that A(x) must be continuous, since f (x) is continuous.
This implies that the function A(x) has a kink at x̄, and the value A(x̄) is the same as the
left and the right limit of A(x) as x goes to x̄.
Worker Problem We now turn to the worker’s utility maximization problem for a given
level of accumulation A. His utility is his employment probability minus the cost of application. We restrict our attention to nontrivial cost c ∈ (0, 1) so that at least some workers
apply and the number of applications is finite. The worker solves:

max (1 −

K∈Z+

 A K
M

) − cK.

To analyze this problem, it is useful to define the gross marginal benefit of the k + 1th
application M Bk+1 . It is a function of
A
M Bk+1 ( M
)=1−

A
M

 A k+1
M

∈ [0, 1]:

 A  k   A k 
A
− 1−
=
1−
.
M
M
M

The marginal benefit is equal to the increase in employment probability due to the k + 1th
application. In other words it is the probability that the first k applications are not successful
and the k + 1th application is. We graph the marginal benefit of the first three applications
for

A
M

∈ [0, 1] in Figure 8 together with a cost of 0.07.
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A(x)
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Figure 8: Marginal benefits of applications 1-3
Note that, for a fixed

A
M,

the marginal benefit always decreases in k. With constant marginal

cost c, the solution to the worker’s problem is to increase the number of applications as long
A
) the set of solutions to the worker’s
as the marginal benefit exceeds cost. Denote by K( M

problem, who faces probability

A
M

A
of his application not being successful. K( M
) satisfies

the following properties:
A
1. If A = 0, then K( M
) = 1. This is because employment probability is one for any K

and additional applications only increase cost.
2. For all A ∈ (0, M (1 − c)):
A
A k
A
A
) = (M
) (1 − M
) 6= c for any k ∈ Z+ , then K( M
) = k̂ + 1 such that
• If M Bk+1 ( M
A k̂
) (1 −
(M

A
M)

A k̂−1
> c and ( M
) (1 −

A
M)

< c.

A
A k̃
A
• If M Bk̃+1 ( M
) = (M
) (1 − M
) = c, the worker is indifferent between k̃ and k̃ + 1
A
applications, i.e. K( M
) is then the set {k̃, k̃ + 1}.
A
A
3. If A > M (1 − c), then M B1 ( M
) < c and K( M
) = 0. If A = M (1 − c), then
A
A
M B1 ( M
) = c and K( M
) = {0, 1}.
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After examining the accumulation function and the worker’s solution separately, we describe
their consistency in equilibrium.
Equilibrium

Given cost c, firm mass M , and the distribution of worker types F , an

equilibrium are functions (A, k) such that
• Given A : [0, 1] → [0, M ], the number of applications sent out by each worker k :
[0, 1] → Z+ maximizes his respective utility. That is, for all x:

k(x) = arg max 1 −
k∈Z+

 A(x) k
M

− ck

• Given k, a continuous function A is a solution to the differential equation:
−A0 (x) = f (x)(1 −

 A(x) k(x)
M

),

(1)

wherever applicable2 , with initial condition A(1) = 0.
An equilibrium exists, since each worker’s solution only depends on the decisions of higherranked workers through A(x) and we can solve for the equilibrium starting from the highestranked worker. In practice this involves identifying cutoff types and respective cutoff accumulations for which there is a discontinuity in k(x) and kink point in A(x). In the intervals
between these cutoff types all worker types send out the same number of applications, so
A(x) follows the differential equation.
As we mentioned before it is possible for workers with a cutoff type to be indifferent between
two adjacent numbers of applications. However, in equilibrium, varying the tie-breaking rule
for these types can only affect a zero measure of workers3 . For simplicity we restrict the
2

‘Applicable’ here refers to x within non-zero measure intervals of types sending the same number of
application, for which the derivative exists.
3
To elaborate, there are two different categories of cases where there is a tie. First of all, for types where
A(x)
< 1 − c, we have k(x) > 0 and A(x) strictly decreasing. Worker types indifferent between k and k + 1
M
are of measure zero since M Bk+1 ( A(x)
) = ( A(x)
)k (1 − A(x)
) = c is only satisfied for maximal two points in
M
M
M
the type space.
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analysis to left-continuous k for the rest of this paper. In summary:
Proposition 14. The equilibrium exists and is unique up to a measure zero set of workers.
A
As we can see from Figure 8, the marginal benefit of the first application (M B1 ( M
)) is

a monotone decreasing function of
in

A
M.

A
M,

while the other marginal benefits are single peaked

Furthermore, as noted before, the marginal benefit decreases in k, so the curves

are nested within each other, with higher numbers of applications being further on the
inside. These properties of the marginal benefits and from the continuity and monotonicity
of function A : [0, 1] → R+ , give rise to the main result.
Theorem 1. The equilibrium number of applications k(x) is single-peaked in x.
We provide a detailed proof in Appendix 2.7.2.
This result implies that for workers of types to the right of the peak, the number of applicaA
)
tions decreases with rank. These workers have a lower per-application success rate (1 − M

than higher type competitors but tend to make up for it by sending out more applications.
To the left of the peak, the number of applications increases with type and lower type
workers apply less because they are discouraged by the low per-application success rate.
Therefore, the decline in employment probability is exacerbated for these workers, with the
lowest type worker incurring the lowest probability.
Furthermore from the previous discussion on the workers’ problem we know k(0) = 0 implies
A(0) < M (1 − c) and k(0) > 0 implies A(0) < M (1 − c), so:
Corollary 1. If the lowest type workers send out zero applications then total employment
A(0) is given by M (1 − c). If the lowest type workers send out a strictly positive number
of applications, total employment is strictly less than M (1 − c).
Secondly, there may be types who are indifferent between k = 0 and k = 1. Let x0 be a type with
0)
0)
M B1 ( A(x
) = 1− A(x
= c. In equilibrium there cannot be a non-zero measure of types x < x0 sending out
M
M
0)
a strictly positive number of applications, so all lower types must have marginal benefit equal to M B1 ( A(x
).
M
The proof is by contradiction: Assume there is an interval of worker types sending out a strictly positive
number of applications, then A(x) is strictly increasing over this interval. Take a type x0 in the interior of
0
)
) < c since A(x0 ) > A(x0 ). Hence a strictly positive number of applications
the interval, then M B1 ( A(x
M
cannot be optimal for this type.
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Normalization

A property of our model is that the employment probability depends

only on rank and not on the cardinality of types. Consequently, the equilibrium is invariant
to the worker type distribution and we can express all objects of interests in terms of the
worker’s percentile ranking, i.e. the cdf F (x), as transformed type.
Formally, for an equilibrium (A, K) with distribution F there exists an equivalent representation of an equilibrium (Ã, K̃) defined over types x̃ = F (x) satisfying the following:
− Ã0 (x̃) = 1 −

 Ã(x̃) K̃(x̃)
M

K̃(x̃) = arg max 1 −

 Ã(x̃) k
M

k

− ck

This can be obtained by a straightforward change of variables as illustrated in Appendix
2.7.3. This allows us to state the following results:
Corollary 2. Denote by (AF , K F ) and (AG , K G ) equilibria from two distributions F and G,
respectively. For any pair (x, x0 ) ∈ [0, 1]2 such that F (x) = G(x0 ), we have AF (x) = AG (x0 ).
Corollary 3. Total employment in the economy does not depend on F .
Without loss of generality, we restrict attention to a uniform distribution hereafter, by
letting the type x̃ as x, and the equilibrium objects (Ã, K̃) as (A, K).
2.3.1. Example
Here we demonstrate how to find the equilibrium for a set of parameter values. Let c =

4
27

and M = 0.7. For this cost at most two applications are sent out in equilibrium.
For k = 1, 2, there is an analytic solution for A(x) for all x < x̂ with initial value A(x̂) = A:

A(x) = M (1 − (1 −

A − x̂−x
)e M )
M

(k = 1)

A
x̂ − x
)+
)
M
M

(k = 2)

A(x) = M tanh(tanh−1 (

where tanh stands for hyperbolic tangent function. We can solve for the three cutoff types
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Eqm. Applications k(x)
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Figure 9: k(x) and A(x). Cutoff types indicated by dashed lines
which satisfy

A(x)
A(x)
M (1− M )

= c, and 1− A(x)
M = c. Figure 9 shows the equilibrium schedule of

applications and A(x). Note A(x) is steeper for types that apply twice and has a maximum
value of M (1 − c) ≈ 0.6.
As Figure 10 shows, the equilibrium employment probability jumps when the number of
applications changes. Furthermore worker types in [0.65, 0.87] have a similar probability
to types in (0.87, 0.97], while types below 0.65 are consistently less likely to find a job the
lower their type.
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Figure 10: Equilibrium Employment Probability
(B,C)
1
2
3

1
+ 13 23 )
(1, 13 )
(1, 13 )

( 23 , 23 13

2

3

( 23 , 23 23 + 13 · 1)
(1, 13 · 0 + 23 )
(1, 13 · 0 + 23 )

( 23 , 1)
(1, 1)
(1, 1)

Table 4: Match Probabilities, Three Slots Case

2.4. Comparative Statics
In this section we examine how equilibrium outcomes relate to the market tightness M and
application cost c.
Simple Example Revisited We illustrate our results with a modified version of our
simple example. Assume there are now M = 3 jobs. Employment probability is: Compared
to the case with M = 2, the payoffs uniformly increased for both workers, which is intuitive.
The marginal benefits are:
MB
A
B
C (1)
C (2)

1−0
1

2−1
0

2
3
4
9
1
3

1
3
3
9
1
3

3−2
0
0
2
9
1
3

Table 5: Marginal Benefits of an Application for Three Slots Case
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Observe that a higher M has an ambiguous effect on the marginal benefit of applications.
Worker B’s first application is more valuable now, while the reverse is true for the second.
For instance, for c between

1
3

and

4
9,

worker B applies twice if there are two jobs and

only once when there are three. Worker C, however, does not apply with two jobs and
applies once with three. This suggest, that with higher M , workers ranked in the mid-range
decrease their search effort, due to diminished insurance incentives, while low-rank workers
increase their search effort, encouraged by greater availability of jobs.
We can further note that decreasing the cost of application might hurt worker C in equilibrium. For the above range of c the worker C has expected utility
B has

21
33

+

12
33

−c =

4
9

−c <

1
9.

However, if c is slightly below

2
3

− c < 13 , and worker

1
3,

worker B sends out

two applications, and worker C sends three applications (see fourth row of the table). The
utility is 1 − 2c >

1
3

for worker B, and 1 − 3c > 0 for worker C. For c close enough to 13 ,

worker B gains from a lower cost, while worker C is worse off. Next, we provide a formal
analysis using the full model.
2.4.1. Market Tightness
Figure 11 depicts the marginal benefits for two sizes of job pools, M = 1 and M 0 = 0.8,
represented by the blue and red graph respectively. The marginal benefit of the first application 1 −

A(x)
M

is uniformly lower for smaller M , while the marginal benefits of additional

applications increase for small A, and decrease for large A.
This suggests that, for fewer available jobs, higher type workers might increase and lower
types might decrease their number of applications. Indeed we demonstrate that this is
the case by showing that equilibrium objects can be normalized with respect to M . The
normalization further allows us to determine that the expected quality of a worker hired by
firms in equilibrium is decreasing in the M .
Define Â( 1−x
M )=

A(x)
M .

The equilibrium can be restated with the new transformed variable
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Figure 11: Marginal Benefit for Applications 1-3
x̂ =

1−x
M

1
1
and equilibrium functions (Â, K̂), Â : [0, M
] → R+ , and K̂ : [0, M
] → Z+ :

Â0 (x̂) = 1 − Â(x̂)K̂(x̂) ,

Â(0) = 0

K̂(x̂) ∈ K(Â(x̂))

where K(·) maps from the accumulation that a worker faces to the set of the worker’s best
response.
These equilibrium objects do not depend on M except through changes in the domain.
Figure 12 depicts an example application schedule for transformed types and different M ,
with x̂ = 0 as the highest type x = F (1). A high M corresponds to a smaller domain, since
the red lines indicate the number of applications sent by the lowest type worker, x̂ =

1
M,

which is weakly higher for larger M . The observed application pattern (represented by
the blue line) is cropped by the red lines. We further see that the maximum number of
applications sent out by any worker can only decrease with larger M .
The equivalence of the original and the newly transformed equilibrium definition implies
that the objects of interest are scaled by M . Let us denote by a ‘cutoff type’ xj who is
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Figure 12: Observed Investment Behavior for Different M
indifferent between sending out j and j + 1 applications. In particular, on the rescaled type
space, the cutoff types x̂j and accumulations Â(x̂j ) are invariant in M . Therefore, for two
different levels of market tightness M0 , M1 , with γ =

x̂j0 =

M1
M0

we have

1 − xj1
1 − xj0
=
= x̂j1 , ∀j,
M0
M1
γ(1 − x̂j0 ) = 1 − x̂j1 .

We now describe how M relates to total employment and firms’ hiring probability defined
as total employment over job pool size. Without loss of generality assume γ < 1. The
following proposition follows immediately from the normalization and Corollary 1.
Proposition 15. If K0 (0) = 0 and K1 (0) = 0, then A1 (0) = γA0 (0), that is, total employment is proportional to M . Firms’ hiring probability is the same regardless of M .
If K0 (0) > 0 or K1 (0) > 0 or both, then γA0 (0) < A1 (0), that is, the difference in total
employment is less than proportional to the difference in vacancy pool size. Firms’ hiring
probability is lower for higher M .
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How application behavior differs by M is not obvious. Given a tighter market some workers
might try harder to secure a job and some workers might be discouraged and apply less. It
turns out that for smaller M , high types tend to apply more and lower types less:
Proposition 16. There exist a cutoff type such that all workers with higher types apply
weakly more with M0 compared to M1 and the converse is true for lower types.
Proof. Take the type to be the lowest type that applies strictly more for M = M1 .
Since all workers’ normalized type x̂ is higher for smaller M , this result reflects the nonmonotonicity of application behavior in type from our main theorem.
Note that worker types who apply more with small M do not need to have a higher employment probability compared to the case with large M , since the fraction of available jobs is
also smaller.
Worker Quality and Firm Entry We now show that the average quality of hired
workers decrease with M . The unconditional expected quality of a worker hired by a firm
is given by:
1
E[x|hired]P r(hired)
=
M

Z

1

A(0)
P r(x is hired)x dx
M
max{x,0}

Z

1

−

=
max{x,0}

A0 (x)
x dx.
M

It turns out that first order stochastic dominance in the worker type distribution over M
carries over to

A(x)
M

and we can establish the following:

Proposition 17. For equilibria of two economies with (M1 , F1 ) and (M2 , F2 ), if
1−F2 (x)
M2

1−F1 (x)
M1

≤

for all x, then the expected quality of hired workers in economy 2 is weakly higher

than in economy 1.
The proof can be found in 2.7.4.
Therefore, if either 1 − F2 first order stochastically dominates 1 − F2 and M1 = M2 , or
F1 = F2 and M2 < M1 , the expected quality of hired workers will be higher in economy
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2. If we consider an initial stage in which firms can choose to enter at some cost v > 0, it
immediately follows that there is a unique M that solves the free entry condition:

E[x] − v = E[x|hired]P r(hired)

1
−v =0
M

2.4.2. Application Costs
Now we examine the relationship between application behavior and cost c. Note that a
lower c is equivalent to a higher wage since the application decision is determined by the

k
condition w A(x)
(1 − A(x)
M
M ) ≥ c, which only depends on the ratio of cost to wage. There
are two forces to consider for a lower c. On the one hand, workers have a higher net-return
on each application. On the other hand, because higher-rank workers might apply more,
low-rank workers might have a lower per-application success rate. Hence, it is not clear
how a worker’s application choice and utility relate to the cost. Counter-intuitively some
workers might apply fewer times and be worse off with lower cost.
This can be seen from the results of a numerical exercise for c ∈ {0.148, 0.198, 0.248} and
M = 0.7. Figure 13 depicts equilibrium applications for different values of c. Some worker
types around 0.1 do not apply for c = 0.198 but apply for the other cost values. We see from
Figure 14 which plots worker utility, that utility for these workers is higher for c = 0.248
than c = 0.148.
Alternatively, we can consider a frictionless market with c ≈ 0 and perfectly assortative
matching. All workers in the top M -percentile find a job with certainty. So if M < 1,
then workers of types x < 1 − M remain unemployed. Now turn to the case with a slightly
higher cost. We can conjecture that the workers in the top M -th percentile get hired with
probability slightly less than one and some workers with types just below 1 − M now apply
and have a strictly positive employment probability.
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Figure 13: Equilibrium Applications for Different Levels of c
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Figure 14: Worker Utility for Different Levels of c

2.5. Efficiency
Note that each worker’s search imposes a negative externality on lower type workers, since
they ‘take away’ jobs from the vacancy pool. When evaluating whether to make an additional application, workers weigh the increase in employment probability against c but do
not consider the effect on lower-rank workers, or specifically, that a newly found job could
have otherwise been taken by another lower type worker.
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To illustrate the discrepancy between individual and social welfare, we can consider the
problem of a social planner whose objective is to maximize total worker utility, which is equal
to total employment minus total application costs. Assume that the planner can dictate
each worker type to send out a particular number of applications but is still constrained by
the anonymity assumption and application friction. The planner solves:
Z
k∈K

1

1−

max

 A(x) k(x)

0

s.t. − A0 (x) = 1 −

M

 A(x) k(x)
M

− ck(x) dx

, A(1) = 0, ∀x.

The planner’s solution satisfies two conditions:
Proposition 18. In the planner’s solution:
1. If all workers send out applications, the number of applications is decreasing in type.
2. If some workers send zero applications, then all workers send at most one application.
The formal proof can be found in the Appendix 2.7.5. We show that any problem that
maximizes total employment for a fixed cost has a solution of this form. For a fixed number
of total applications (and hence fixed total cost), if some interval of worker types sends
more applications than an adjacent interval of lower types, then employment can always be
increased by switching the number of applications for these two type intervals.
Note that this result must not apply if the planner’s objective depends on cardinal worker
types. However, our formulation of the planner’s objective can be seen as the limit case
when worker types are arbitrarily close to each other while preserving the rank. In the
limit, the match quality is irrelevant for the social point of view.
Numerical Example Revisited We demonstrate that the market solution in our numerical example from Section 3.1 is not welfare maximizing. Figure 15 depicts a solution
(in red) that achieves the same level of employment as the market equilibrium (in blue)
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with lower costs. From the upper graph, we see applications decrease from 2 to 1 at around
x = 0.5, and everyone sends out nonzero applications. In the lower graph we see that A(0)
is the same for both solutions, but the employment accumulation is higher for most types
in the market equilibrium. In the full solution to the planner’s problem, total employment
would be lower than in the cost-minimizing solution given here.
planner solution
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Figure 15: Cost-Min.(Market) Sol. in red(blue) with Long(Short) Dashed Lines at Cutoff
Types
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2.6. Conclusion
We examined how heterogeneity in ranking of workers by firms, translates into differences
in search effort and employment probability. We find that if a worker’s rank is sufficiently
high, he applies more than higher-ranked competitors to insure against the event of firms
choosing someone else. However if a worker’s rank is rather low, his poor chances of success
per application discourage him from applying as much as more highly-ranked counterparts.
In this case, the disadvantage from the lower per-application success rate is amplified by
lower search effort. This offers a novel insight to unequal labor market matching outcomes:
higher unemployment among low-skilled workers can arise due to search effort choices.
We further showed that workers’ equilibrium number of applications and utility can depend
ambiguously on the size of the vacancy pool and application costs. Lastly, we showed that
in a solution that maximizes worker utility the number of applications must decrease in
type.

2.7. Appendix to Chapter 2
2.7.1. Alternative Derivation of DE
Assume a large economy, and then let ϕ(x) ∈ [0, 1] be the deterministic probability that
type x’s application results in an offer. We now derive ϕ(x) by examining under which
conditions a particular firm is willing to hire worker x.
Fix a worker type x, and assume that there are N different segments in the type space [x, 1],
and all types in one segment choose identical number of applications. That is, the type space
[x, 1] can be segmented by N different numbers x = x0 < x1 < x2 < . . . < xN −1 < xN = 1
such that all types in (xi−1 , xi ) send out the same number of applications. This restriction
is not necessary for the proof, but does hold in any equilibrium.
We refer to the types in (xi−1 , xi ) as the i-th group. Denote by ki ∈ Z+ the applications
sent out by group i, and λi = F (xi ) − F (xi−1 ) the mass of group i. Since the applications
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are uniformly randomly distributed over firms, the total number of applications received by
a single firm is a random Poisson variable. For the collection (ki , λi )N
i=1 , the Poisson arrival
rate of applications from types higher than x is given by

λ(x) =

N
X

ki λi =

i=1

N
X

λ(x)
M ,

where

ki (F (xi ) − F (xi−1 ))

i=1

This object, divided by the mass of firms M , is the ‘gross queue length’ of competing
applications from higher types for an individual job.
An application by x generates an offer from the firm when either (1) the firm has no other
applications or (2) there are other applications but all competitors choose other offers. For
(2), the probability that a competing application is from i-th group is

Pki λi .
ki λi

A competitor

zi ∈ (xi−1 , xi ) randomizes equally over his offers if there are multiple. The probability that
zi picks an offer other than the one at the firm considered is given by:

Pi (zi ; ϕ) =

kX
i −1
j=0



j
ki − 1
ϕ(zi )j (1 − ϕ(zi ))ki −1−j .
j+1
j

The term within the summation states the following. For the ki −1 applications the competitors sends out to other firms, the worker generates j offers with a probability that depends
on his probability of success ϕ(zi ). The worker chooses on of the j offers with probability
j
j+1 .

This is true for any zi ∈ (xi−1 , xi ), the probability that the competitor does not take the
job at this specific firm conditional on there being one from group i is given by:
Z

xi

Pi (z; ϕ)
xi−1

f (z)
dz := pi (ϕ)
λi

Therefore, the overall probability that the job is not taken by a competitor from any group
is:
X ki λi
X k i Z xi
J(x) =
pi (ϕ) =
Pi (z; ϕ)f (z)dz
λ(x)
λ(x) xi−1
i

i
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From the large market assumption, the probability is independent across competitors and
with n > 1 competitors, the probability that the job is not taken is simply J(x)n .
Since the number of competitors (random variable N ) is a Poisson random variable with
gross queue length as parameter, the expectation summarizes to:
h

ϕ(x) = EN J(x)

N

i

=

∞
X
( λ(x) )n e−
M

n=0

n!

λ(x)
M

J(x)n = e−λ(x)(1−J(x))

The last equality follows from the fact that E[aX ] = exp(λ(a − 1)) for X ∼ P ois(λ) and
a > 0.
This expression is similar to the one in Kircher (2009). The difference is that in our case, the
probability of generating an offer is defined recursively as an expectation over the probability
of types higher than x.
If ϕ(x) is differentiable at x, taking the log and differentiating with respect to x yields:
ϕ0 (x)
d
λ(x)
=
(−
(1 − J(x)))
ϕ(x)
dx
M
Note that from the definition of J(x),

λ(x)J(x) =

N
X
i=2

Z

xi

ki

Z

x1

Pi (z; ϕ)f (z) dz + k1
xi−1

P1 (z; ϕ)f (z) dz
x

so that
d λ(x)
f (x)
(
J(x)) = −k1 P1 (x; ϕ)
.
dx M
M
Furthermore:

d
λ(x) = −k1 f (x),
dx
We can rewrite:
ϕ0 (x)
f (x)
= −k1
(P1 (x; ϕ) − 1)
ϕ(x)
M
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Taking the complement of the binomial sum:

P1 (x; ϕ) =

kX
1 −1
j=0

=1−



k1 − 1
j
ϕ(x)j (1 − ϕ(x))k1 −1−j
j + 1 k1 − 1 − j

kX
1 −1
j=0



1
k1 − 1
ϕ(x)j (1 − ϕ(x))k1 −1−j
j + 1 k1 − 1 − j

Using this result and changing indices, we get the sum:

ϕ(x)k1 (P1 (x; ϕ) − 1) = −

kX
1 −1
j=0

=−



k1
k1 − 1
ϕ(x)j+1 (1 − ϕ(x))k1 −1−j
j + 1 k1 − 1 − j

k1  
X
k1
ϕ(x)l (1 − ϕ(x))k1 −l
l
l=1

= −(1 − (1 − ϕ(x))k1 )

So we see that:
ϕ0 (x) =

f (x)
(1 − (1 − ϕ(x))k1 ))
M

1 − ϕ(x) the proportion of jobs that are already taken up by types higher than x. That
is, by definition 1 − ϕ(x) =

A(x)
M ,

and we arrive at the DE defined in the main part of the

paper:
−A0 (x) = f (x)(1 − (

A(x) k
) ).
M

2.7.2. Proof of Theorem 1
Consider the following possibilities:
• A(x) < M (1 − c) for all x: In this case, everyone sends out 1 or more applications
and A is strictly decreasing everywhere.
l
Define Al as the cutoff accumulation for which M Bl+1 ( A
M) =



Al
M

l

l
(1− A
M ) = c for l ∈

Z+ \{0}. In general, Al has either two or zero real solutions due to single-peakedness
of the marginal benefits. Denote the two solutions (Al , Āl ). The types xl for which
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A(xl ) = Al or A(xl ) = Āl are indifferent between sending out l + 1 applications and
l applications. A is continuous, strictly decreasing, and we assumed that types that
are indifferent are choosing the smaller number of application. Therefore, the set of
types who send out l or more applications

Xl = {x ∈ [0, 1] : A(x) ∈ (Al , Āl ]}
high
is a connected interval on [0, 1]. Denote this interval by [xlow
]. From the del , xl

creasing marginal benefit, it is true that the sets are nested: for all l ≥ 1
high
high
] ⊇ [xlow
Xl = [xlow
l+1 , xl+1 ] = Xl+1
l , xl

Mapping the nested set of intervals to the respective number of applications, we get
a single-peaked graph.
• A(x) = M (1−c) for some x: In this case, there is an interval [0, x̄] where K( A(x̄)
M ) = 0.
0
For x > x̄, K( A(x)
M ) > 0 and A (x) < 0; this implies that the above observation applies

and the equilibrium applications is single-peaked. For x < x̄, the applications is 0.
2.7.3. Proof of Normalization
We change variables and define x̃ = F (x), and F −1 (x̃) = x. Assuming F is continuous,
differentiable and one-to-one, its inverse is well-defined and the equilibrium conditions can
be rewritten as
−A0 (F −1 (x̃)) = F 0 (F −1 (x̃))(1 −

 A(F −1 (x̃)) k(F −1 (x̃))
M

k(F −1 (x̃)) = K(A(F −1 (x̃)))
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),

F 0 (F −1 (x̃)) =

1
dF −1 (x̃)
dx̃

, so that

−A0 (F −1 (x̃))

 A(F −1 (x̃)) k(F −1 (x̃))
dF −1 (x̃)
=1−
.
dx̃
M

Let A(F −1 (x̃)) = Ã(x̃), and k(F −1 (x̃)) = K̃(x̃). Then:
−Ã0 (x̃) = 1 −

 Ã(x̃) K̃(x̃)
M

K̃(x̃) ∈ K(

,

Ã(x̃)
)
M

2.7.4. Proof for Proposition 17
We show that

1−F1 (x)
M2

FOSD

1−F1 (x)
M1

implies that
Z

A2 (x)
A1 (x)
≤
⇐⇒
M1
M2
Z

1

⇐⇒
x

1

−
x

A1 (x)
M1

≤

A2 (x)
M2

A01 (y)
dy ≤
M1

for all x:

1

Z

−
x

A02 (y)
dy
M2

Z 1
 A (y) k1 (y) f (y)
 A (y) k2 (y) f (y)
1
1
2
2
(1 −
)
dy ≤
(1 −
)
dy
M1
M1
M2
M2
x
Z

⇐⇒

1−F1 (x)
M1

(1 − Ã(z)

K̃(z)

Z
)dz ≤

0

Last line by the change of variables z =

1−F2 (x)
M2

(1 − Ã(z)K̃(z) )dz

0
1−Fi (x)
Mi .

It is then straightforward to show that first order stochastic dominance in

A(x)
M

implies higher

expected quality. Since the endpoints are the same for all equilibria: A1 (1) = A2 (1) = 0,
by the fundamental theorem of calculus:
A2 (x)
A1 (x)
≤
⇐⇒ 0 ≤
M1
M2

Z

1

x
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A0 (y)
− 1 dy ≤
M1

Z

1

−
x

A02 (y)
dy
M2

Applying integration by parts, for all x, we obtain that
Z

1

x

Z 1
A1 (y)
A01 (y)
A1 (x)
−
y dy =
x+
dy
M1
M1
M1
x
Z 1
A2 (x)
A2 (y)
≤
x+
dy
M2
M2
x
Z 1
A0 (y)
− 2 y dy
=
M2
x

2.7.5. Proof for Section 6
First of all, it is without loss of generality to focus on piecewise continuous k, since any
measure zero change of k’s does not affect the objective. Secondly, we can also rule out any
nonzero gap in the support of k(x), where k(x) takes a nonzero value, because one can find
a k with connected support that obtains the same value. Formally:
Lemma 3. For n > m > 0 number of applications, assume that in an equilibrium, there is
a lower type applies less than a higher type, i.e., there are types x0 > x such that k(x0 ) = n
and k(x) = m. Then the planner can increase the total employment without affecting the
cost.

Proof. There exists small interval ∆ > 0 and threshold x such that k takes value n > m > 0
for z ∈ (x, x+∆] and m > 0 for z ∈ [x−∆, x). For any value A = A(x+∆), the accumulation
up until type x + ∆, the choice of k implies
Z

x

A(x − ∆) =

1−
x−∆

 A(z) m
M

Z

x+∆

1−

dz +
x

 A(z) n
M

dz + A(x + ∆)

Now consider an application schedule of the planner k ∗ which differs from k only for types
in [x − ∆, x + ∆]. In particular, k(z) = m for z ∈ (x, x + ∆] and k(z) = n for z ∈ [x − ∆, x).
Since k = k ∗ over [x + ∆, 1], the accumulations A and A∗ , are also equivalent for these
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types, however,
Z

∗

x

1−

A (x − ∆) =
x−∆

 A(z) n
M

Z

x+∆

1−

dz +

 A(z) m

x

M

dz + A(x + ∆)

Let A = A(x + ∆). For small ∆, the integrals are approximated by:


1−



1−

 A + (1 − ( A )n )∆ m 
M

M


 A n 
∆+ 1−
∆ + A,
M

 A + (1 − ( A )m )∆ n 
M

M


 A m 
∆+ 1−
∆+A
M

We show that we can find small ∆ around x such that the second term is greater than the
first. If so, then by switching the numbers of application for these ∆ interval of types, the
planner achieves higher total employment without affecting the cost. Expanding the two
A n
A m
) +1−(M
) term is common for both sums. Cancelling them
sums of polynomials, 1 − ( M

out, we have to compare:
 A + (1 − ( A )n )∆ m  A m
M
−
+
M
M

(a)

 A + (1 − ( A )m )∆ n  A n
M
+
−
M
M

(b)

We can compare the coefficients of the same order of

∆
M.

Expansion yields that the k-th

order terms (k ≤ m < n) are
  
 A n k  ∆ k
m
A m−k 
−
1−
M
M
M
k

(a-k)

  
 A m k  ∆  k
n
A n−k 
−
1−
k M
M
M

(b-k)
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respectively. Division yields their ratio:
 m−1
A
 1 − ( A )n k
m(m − 1) . . . (m − k + 1) M
M
 n−1
A m
1
−
(
A
M)
n(n − 1) . . . (n − k + 1) M
Collecting terms, this ratio can be written as:
A m−1
)
m( M
A m
1−( M
)
A n−1
n( M
)
A n
)
1−( M

|

{z

(1)

 k−1
Y m − z  1 − ( A )n k−1
z=1

n−z

|

1−
{z

M
A m
(M
)

(2)

}

}

Note that for the first order term (k = 1), the part (2) vanishes. The following claim shows
that (1) is greater than 1, from which follows that the magnitude of the first order effect in
(a) is greater than the effect in (b).
Claim 3. For A < M , part (1) is greater than 1.

Proof of claim. For simplicity, denote
m 1
n xn−m

A
M

by x ∈ [0, 1]. Since n > m, it is true that

mxm−1
nxn−1

=

is strictly decreasing in x. Hence, for all y > x,

mxm−1 ny n−1 > nxn−1 my m−1 ,

Integrating both sides from x to 1:
mxm−1
nxn−1
>
.
1 − xm
1 − xn

(A)

Note that this is true for any x < 1, and in the limit as x goes to 1, the two expressions are
equal.

Therefore, for k = 1, (a-k) is strictly smaller than (b-k). The signs of the differences of
higher order terms are ambiguous, but their effects are dominated by the first order effect,
for small ∆.

88

Formally, if we denote by B =

mxm−1
1−xm

−

nxn−1
1−xn

> 0, the difference in first order term, then,

(b)-(a) is given by:
B

∆
∆
− O(( )2 )
M
M

 2
∆
Furthermore, the big-O term is bounded above by (the most conservative bound) n! M
,
hence, the difference is
B

∆
∆
− o( ).
M
M

In fact, this is true independent of A as long as

A
M

< 1. Hence, even if A varies with ∆

the result holds. For small enough ∆, the expression is strictly positive and the planner’s
solution outperforms the market equilibrium.

For the second part of the proposition, we prove the following lemma:
Lemma 4. In the planner’s solution, if some workers send out more than one application,
then all workers send out at least one application.

Proof. Suppose, on the contrary, that there are some workers who send out m ≥ 2 applications, while some other workers send out zero applications. From the previous lemma,
we see that the planner’s solution has to be monotone. Hence, the only possibility is that
the workers increase the number of applications up until some threshold type, and all types
below the threshold do not apply.
We show that the planner can improve this outcome. Denote by A the total accumulation
up until the cutoff type x. Then, there exists an interval [x, x + ∆] of types who send out
m applications. Take a small neighborhood ε < ∆ of x and let [x, x + ε] workers instead
send m − 1 applications and let the [x − ε, x] workers send one application. By letting
Ã = A(x + ε), the high types [x, x + ε] lose

(

Ã
Ã m−1
)
(1 −
)ε.
M
M
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The gain by the low types [x − ε, x] is


Ã m−1 
)
)ε
Ã + (1 − ( M
Ã
Ã m−1 ε2
1−
ε = (1 −
)ε − (1 −
)
M
M
M
M

The difference between them is:

Ã m−1
(1 − ( M
)
)(1 −

Again, as long as

Ã
M

Ã
M )ε

Ã m−1 1 2
− (1 − ( M
)
)M ε .

remains strictly bounded away from 1, for ε small enough, the switch

increases employment.
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CHAPTER 3 : A Critical Literature Review on Markets with Search and
Information Frictions
3.1. Introduction
In an introductory economics framework, it is assumed that there is ‘Walrasian auctioneer’ who magically and impartially sets the price that clears the market. Although this
framework usually captures the basic underlying forces of an economy, there have long been
attempts to provide a more concrete foundation for how a market functions, and whether
neglecting such factors would lead to a drastically different conclusion. Most notably, it
is reasonable and realistic to think about a decentralized market, in which it takes time
and effort to find a trading partner (search friction) and some agents know more about
the good to be traded than others (information friction). Adding these frictions into the
model seem to yield a very different outcome from the Walrasian benchmark. Diamond
(1971) has famously noted that the presence of very small search costs, which an agent
incurs in order to search for an alternative, will raise equilibrium prices to monopoly levels.
Akerlof (1974) has also shown that information asymmetry can lead to a perfect collapse
of profitable market transactions. Spence (1974) has also shown that a market outcome
may involve inefficiency when the agents try to overcome such information asymmetry. The
objective of this article is to review the recent literature on such market frictions and extend
its modeling implications to the search equilibrium in an applied sense.
Most importantly, this article will be interested in the labor market with an on-the-job
search. On-the-job search is known to be an important channel through which workers raise
income, and it is also known to represent a large flow in the labor market. Although it is an
interesting question to disentangle the underlying forces behind a job transition (promotion
or demotion), or how the career concerns feed into the equilibrium job transition patterns,
addressing these questions can be tricky once we incorporate informational components into
the model.
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This article proceeds as follows. The first section starts with a review of the theoretical
treatment of markets with search and information frictions. I start out from the article
by Lester et al. (2019) to highlight the underlying economic forces behind trading in such
markets. I highlight the role of screening and how such elements can generate complex
market dynamics. Next, I briefly discuss an important innovation by Guerrieri et al. (2010)
which is the most well-known and tractable framework to model markets with the asymmetry of information. Most importantly, I argue how the robustness of separating equilibrium
comes about and show why it useful. Later I move on to the topics related to the search
equilibrium and discuss two papers regarding communication in such settings. The search
and information frictions combined are shown to affect the informativeness of communication in an equilibrium, through two papers: Menzio (2007), and Harrington Jr and Ye
(2017). In the second section, I move on to the topic of the labor market. I first discuss
Golan (2009) which is an illustrative example of how the forces of information revelation
work in the intra-firm wage bargaining. Next, I discuss Doppelt (2016) which is written
in the symmetric information framework but provides a very good characterization of how
incomplete information and reputation concern shape equilibrium wage profile and unemployment hazard. Carrillo-Tudela and Kaas (2015) shows how adverse selection element
shape steady-state job-to-job flows and the wage profile of a worker. Depending on the
parameters, it may be that the equilibrium is perfectly separating (a market for low productivity workers operates separately from the market for high productivity) or it may be
that the equilibrium involves pooling. The latter equilibrium exhibits demotion of low type
workers on the equilibrium path. Lastly, I discuss Visschers (2007) which characterizes
the optimal wage-tenure contract when the firm is privately informed about the worker’s
quality, and the workers can always quit to a wage contract which offers higher value. The
last section summarizes and concludes.
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3.2. A Review on Theoretical Results
The two backbone papers discussed in this section derives from the characterization in
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1978). In a competitive insurance market, Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1978) has shown that the pooling contract is always susceptible to a cream-skimming deviation while a conjectured equilibrium with only separating contracts may also be disrupted
by a pooling contract if the fraction of bad types is small. Lester et al. (2019) explores an
intermediate case when the insurance market may not have perfect competition, that is,
some consumers looking for insurance may be ‘captive’ who has access to only one insurance provider, while others may be ‘non-captive’ and chooses the best deal among the two
insurance providers as in the Rothschild-Stiglitz world. Guerrieri et al. (2010) argues the
robustness of the separating contract by imposing capacity constraints – a cream-skimming
deviation is ruled out if it instead leads to a continuous adjustment of match probability,
rather than a discontinuous jump in payoffs.
3.2.1. Disperson of Contracts: Lester et al. (2019)
Lester et al. (2019) considers a market in which sellers, who know the quality of the good
they possess (good or bad), sells to buyers. Buyers individually post a menu of contracts,
which trades off the trading probability and the terms of trade, in order to screen the sellers.
The problem is a well-known mechanism design problem if the buyer is a monopolist, in
which the buyer optimal menu exhibits the following:
• Good type sellers earn zero rent (binding IR constraint for the low type)
• A bad type seller always trades in the equilibrium (no distortion at the top)
• If there are sufficiently many good types, the good-type seller trades with positive
probability, in which case, bad types are cross-subsidized with positive information
rent.
• If there are not enough good types, good types do not trade at all and only the
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bad-type seller trades (lemons market).
However, assume now that there are two buyers who are not bound by capacity constraints.
Since they are not capacity-constrained, the buyers may compete by undercutting the
other’s offered contract more favorable to the seller. A seller who has access to both buyers
chooses the buyer who offers higher utility.
In case all sellers have access to both buyers, this force reduces to the perfect competition
similar to that in the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1978). In case the pure strategy equilibrium exists, it is the least cost separating equilibrium; in case there is no pure strategy
equilibrium, Rosenthal and Weiss (1984) have shown that there is a unique mixed strategy
equilibrium over a continuum of support. In the equilibrium, buyers receive a negative
surplus from the low types and compensate it from the high types (cross-subsidization).
Similar to the Burdett-Judd (1983) equilibrium, it is shown that the buyers randomize on
the continuum of an interval of contracts, over which the buyers are indifferent due to the
terms and trade probability trade-off.
In these two polar cases, the buyers either offer a perfectly pooling menu or a perfectly
separating menu in an equilibrium. The authors proceed to show that in the intermediate
case with imperfect competition, there may be a region of parameters such that partial
pooling occurs; a buyer aware of the probability that the competitor exists mixes between
offering a pooling contract and offering a separating contract. In this sense, the paper
provides a complete characterization of imperfect competition in the market with adverse
selection, which can provide a richer set of forces underlying comparative statics.
For instance, the authors consider the role of increased competition in the market, manifest
in a higher probability that a seller is non-captive. Increased competition can distort trading
probability for high types in two ways: through the intensive margin in terms of separating
low types from high types, and through the extensive margin (the effect of competition)
that affects equilibrium utility provided to the sellers. It is shown that for some range of
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parameters, these two forces can work in the opposite direction so that increased competition
can decrease the probability of trade.
The authors also consider the role of information revelation in such economy to show that
providing more information (decreasing the adverse selection problem) may some times
lower the social welfare. Viewing ‘more information’ as the dispersion in posteriors, the
authors show that the social welfare function with respect to the composition parameter
may be concave so that ex-ante social welfare is lower compared to no dispersion in the
posterior.
3.2.2. Competitive Search: Guerrieri, Shimer and Wright (2010)
Guerrieri et al. (2010) studied the market with adverse selection using the framework of
competitive search. In the competitive search framework, principals post contracts, while
privately informed agents direct their search to the posted contracts. Assuming that the
principals compete for the agents by posting contracts, zero profit condition for the principal
pins down the matching probability and the composition of agents attracted by the contract.
By adding in the adverse selection element into the competitive search model, the authors
characterize the equilibrium trade-off between the extensive margin (probability of trade)
and the intensive margin (terms of trade).
To briefly outline the model, the authors consider a one-to-one matching environment in
which there is potentially large continuum number of homogeneous principals and a measure
1 of heterogeneous agents. The principals incur the cost of k > 0 for posting a vacancy,
and the equilibrium measure of principals in the market is pinned down by the zero profit
condition for the principals. Since there is asymmetry of information (agents privately know
their types), in general, the principals’ problem is that of posting a mechanism; using the
large market assumption, the authors instead focus on the problem of a principal choosing
a particular contract to offer, which is later shown to be outcome equivalent with the
equilibrium with mechanism posting.
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Denote the set of contracts offered in the equilibrium by C = {y1 , . . . , yI }, where the
index i means that it is a contract intended for a i-type agent to accept. The contract
then must satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints for all types. Since the matching
market is one-to-one, a competitive search equilibrium is defined by the vector of agent
utilities {Ūi }i∈I , market tightness measure Θ that maps from all contracts (including those
not offered in equilibrium) to the space of [0, ∞], and a belief function Γ that coincides
with the distribution of agent types attracted by any contract, which satisfy the optimality
conditions:
• Principals’ profit maximization and free-entry: for all y ∈ Y , [match probability given
Θ] times the [expected value from the set of agents attracted] is equal to k for y offered
in equilibrium, and less than or equal to k for y not offered in equilibrium.
• Agents’ optimal search: for an agent with positive expected value in equilibrium, Ūi >
0, incentive compatibility must be satisfied for all contracts offered in equilibrium,
and for contracts that are not offered in equilibrium, in conjunction with the offthe-equilibrium meeting probability dictated by Θ. The indifference condition must
satisfy for all contracts that an agent i chooses with positive probability.
• Market clearing: The measure of agents present in markets for any contract has to
add up to the total number of agents in the economy. The beliefs that firms hold
about the type of agents present in the market coincides with the correct measure of
agents.
In order to solve for the competitive equilibrium, the authors break down the problem into a
sequence of problems in which type i’s incentive compatibility binds for all its neighborhood
type i + 1, while the incentive compatibility for i + 1 for masquerading to be a lower type
i is slack. Using the indifference condition for upward deviation, the authors can pin down
the market tightness Θ even for the contracts that are not offered in equilibrium. The
single-crossing condition for the two types guarantees that no deviation is profitable for the

96

off-the-equilibrium beliefs about matching probability Θ.
In general, the competitive equilibrium exhibits full separation. Intuitively, this resolves
the non-existence issue in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1978) by assuming capacity constraints,
and by imposing appropriate beliefs (on matching probabilities) that deters any arbitrary
deviations to off-path contracts. The authors show the existence and uniqueness of the
competitive equilibrium and revisit a few earlier examples of markets with adverse selection. Applying their algorithm, they calculate the equilibria and show that the equilibrium
properties such as Pareto inefficiency, and distorted extensive and intensive margins still
continues to hold. Overall, it can be thought of as a unifying framework to treat the
competition with an adverse selection problem, using the tools of competitive search.
In another paper (Guerrieri and Shimer (2014)) this model is extended to a dynamic setting
in which the values of holding assets is also endogenously determined (by the resale value
of a good that one holds). When the seller has better knowledge about the quality of the
asset that he/she holds, this increases the adverse selection problem in the market and can
lead to low liquidity, which depresses the overall asset prices. At the same time, buyers
shifting to the market with less adverse selection leads to the episode of flight-to-quality in
times of financial crisis.
3.2.3. Informativeness of Communication: Menzio (2007), Harrington and Ye (2019)
The literature on directed search has focused on the posting of terms of trade or contracts
that are enforceable. Menzio (2007) instead focused on posting a message to attract the
searchers, while the message itself does not carry any contractual obligations. With the
presence of asymmetry of information, the author shows that the communication can be
partially informative if a more informed party posts cheap talk messages in order to attract
searchers. Important examples of such messages are, help wanted ads posted by an employer,
or list prices posted by intermediaries while the prices are often subject to discounts offered
at the actual transaction stage.
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In Menzio (2007), firms privately draw their productivity y and post a cheap talk message
toward which unemployed workers direct their search. Once a worker applies to the firm, the
firm and the worker negotiate wage through alternating offers bargaining. In this alternating
offers bargaining, there is a time interval of ∆ between rejection and the next counter-offer.
As usual, the cost of delay is captured by the parameter β standing for the breakdown rate
after the firm rejects the worker’s offer. Therefore, when the firm rejects an offer, with
probability 1 − exp(−β∆) the game ends. Similarly, when the worker rejects an offer, the
negotiation breaks down with probability 1 − exp(−(1 − β)∆).
The bargaining is between an informed firm who knows the productivity and the worker
who only has an expectation based on the posted message. The author focuses on the
sequential equilibrium where the firm’s strategy is stationary in the sense that history
matters only through the worker’s beliefs. In equilibrium, delay signals that the firm is
of low productivity, and it can be shown that no firms with productivity y can gain more
than the perfect information case, and no firms are worse off than the firm with the lowest
productivity in the support, bargaining in perfect information. As the interval between
offers vanishes ∆ → 0, the unique equilibrium of the asymmetric information bargaining
game converges to the first round offer and acceptance of the wage that corresponds to the
perfect information outcome of the lowest productivity firm in the support. That is, if the
firm’s productivity lies in the interval [y, ȳ], the bargaining outcome is the wage βy.
Using this equilibrium in the second stage, firms trade off the probability of a hire (queue
length) with the margin (product net wage to be paid to the worker after the bargaining
stage). Since a firm’s incentive to post a higher message (and trade more frequently) is
increasing in the firm’s productivity, while the cost remains independent, there is a natural
single-crossing property in the payoffs that separates the firms’ equilibrium messages. Overall, given the worker’s indifference curve along with the market tightness measures, firms
choose which market to go to; single-crossing guarantees that as we move up the productivity from the lowest productivity firm, firms would like to move up the announcement. Since
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there is a continuum of firms, firms would like to pool with lower productivity firms for
small differences in productivity. Using the indifference conditions, one can identify all the
cutoff types who are indifferent between pooling with lower types and posting a message
that reveals its type.
Harrington et al. (2019) examine how the announcement of list prices can serve as a
means for collusion among competing sellers. Similar to the line of Lester et al. (2019),
the authors consider an environment with imperfect competition, in which there are two
competing sellers, with a seller acting as a monopoly over a fraction b ∈ [0, 1] of buyers who
is in contact with him/her. However, there are two important differences with the Lester
et al. (2019). First of all, unlike the screening problem using posted contracts in Lester et al.
(2019), the authors consider a bargaining stage after a buyer chooses the seller to go to. In
the bargaining round, the seller bargains knowing whether the buyer is captive (the seller
is a monopoly over the buyer) or the buyer is non-captive (the seller is in competition with
another seller.) Secondly, a captive buyer plays a more active role in the game by choosing
which seller to go to. This assumption delivers a non-trivial role of price announcement
from the firm’s part; by announcing a low price announcement, the seller can attract more
buyers despite the fact that the low price announcement may hurt the firm in the bargaining
stage.
The bargaining is modeled as a second price auction with a reserve price set by a buyer. The
reserve price is meant to capture the instances of negotiation breakdown when the seller
has private value over the good to be traded. The seller simultaneously draws his/her cost,
and the good is traded if and only if the cost is below the reserve price set by the buyer. A
buyer who draws a high private value sets a high reserve price and hence admits a higher
probability of trade with the higher average price paid to the seller.
An informative announcement by the seller influences the negotiation outcome by altering
the buyer’s belief about the seller’s distribution of private cost, which gets reflected in
the buyer’s choice of the reservation price. For instance, if the seller convinces the buyer
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that the seller’s cost is high, ceteris paribus, the buyer sets a higher reservation price (less
aggressive in bargaining) from which the seller benefits. This is basically the force that
incentivizes the sellers to collude to a high-cost announcement. However, the presence of
captive buyers (b > 0) gives sellers incentives to cheat on the other firm, by making a lowcost announcement and stealing the market from the other firm. Therefore, an equilibrium
with truthful cost announcement can be sustained with a high fraction of captive buyers
(low incentive to collude).
The authors formulate a repeated version of this ‘cost announcement game’ to show that a
standard grim-trigger type of strategy can be used to sustain the collusive outcome on the
equilibrium path. Furthermore, using a parametrized version of the model, the authors also
show the possibility that social welfare (measured by the expected trade surplus) increase
under collusion through the increased reservation price.

3.3. Application to On-the-Job Search and Bargaining
In this section, I review a few papers examining the asymmetric information bargaining
problems in the labor market setting. The first paper by Golan (2009) examines the channel
through which bargaining can be affected when its outcome (wage) signals outside firms
about the worker’s quality and affects bargaining outcome in the next period.
3.3.1. Asymmetric Learning and Wage Bargaining: Golan (2009)
In this paper, the author considers the wage dynamics of a worker whose productivity is
learned by the current employer. The worker lives for three periods. At period 1, the worker
does not produce anything but the worker and the employer jointly learn the productivity of
the worker θ, which is drawn from an interval [θ, θ̄] according to the distribution f . Although
outside firms do not know the exact realization of the θ, the information is indirectly revealed
to the outside firms through the past history of wage that the worker was paid. The wage
history itself is shaped by the outside offer of expected productivity, and the renegotiation
that can be triggered by a worker at periods 2 and 3. Since the bargaining outcome – wage
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– sends information to the outside firms at the beginning of period 3, this change in belief
is fed into the bargaining problem when the renegotiation is triggered at period 2.
The bargaining protocol is an ultimatum game that lasts for two rounds, t = 1, 2, in which
the proposer is chosen randomly by a toss of a fair coin. In the renegotiation of period 3,
it can be easily seen that the bargaining outcome will be a split of

θ
2

offered and accepted

at the first round of the bargaining. In the period 2 renegotiation, however, each round of
rejection delivers a different message to the outside firms, which means an acceptable offer
at the previous round has to take into account these changing outside options in period 3.
For instance, in round 2 of period 2, if an offer is rejected, nothing is produced and it does
not generate any information to the outside firms at the beginning of period 3. Taking this
into account, the worker’s offer has to compensate for the firm’s loss in surplus in the next
period if the firm is to agree on a type-revealing wage. Therefore, an agreed upon wage at
period 2 renegotiation is lower than 2θ , and the firm expects to earn information rent at this
point.
Given these bargaining outcomes, the author characterizes the threshold productivity below
which workers choose not to renegotiate wage. The threshold worker’s type θ∗ is given by
the indifference condition between the revealing wage profile, which the worker can obtain
by triggering wage renegotiation, and accepting the stream of constant wage θ for the rest of
the period. The threshold is interior because a worker has to give up some of the surpluses
in period 2 bargaining if he/she is to receive a fully revealing competitive wage in period
3. For this conclusion, it is also important that the workers’ outside options, without a
revealing wage, at periods 2 and 3 are given by θ, as dictated by the force of extreme
adverse selection faced by outside firms making an offer. Otherwise, the workers might find
it profitable to take an outside offer greater than θ at period 3.
The outcome wage profile exhibits a two-tier structure. Below the threshold productivity
θ∗ , workers receive a constant wage and do not reveal their types nor trigger renegotiation.
Above the threshold, workers bargain to a low wage at period 2 in order to receive a fully
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revealing, competitive level of compensation at period 3.
3.3.2. Résumé Dynamics and Unemployment Hazard: Doppelt (2016)
Data from the Current Population Survey suggests that a job-finding probability for the
next month can be as low as 30 percentage points for the workers who were unemployed for
a year, compared to the newly unemployed. One hypothesis is that the longer duration of
unemployment serves as a signal about the worker’s quality – a prospective employer cannot
see the worker’s past rejection during a search and is likely to infer that the duration is
because of the worker’s bad quality.
Doppelt (2016) analyzed a dynamic search equilibrium in which a worker’s duration of unemployment affects his/her future employment probability through the learning effect. The
paper is focused on the job finding rate that is determined both by the worker’s reservation
value, and the firm’s value over the worker with a particular job history (résumé). In order
to focus on the effect of learning, any element that leads to asymmetry of information is
ruled out – the environment is kept symmetric despite uncertainty about the worker’s type.
The author considers a model of heterogeneous workers, low and high quality, who are
distinguished by the stochastic process of productivity. The productivity process is Markov;
the high-quality worker’s productivity draw is higher than the low-quality worker’s in the
sense of stochastic dominance. The sufficient statistic for a worker’s experience in the
labor market is the posterior probability about the worker’s type. This is the worker’s
state variable which evolves according to an update rule that is generated endogenously in
equilibrium.
The worker’s history in the labor market is public information, including productivity draws
during employment. When a worker is hired from unemployment, productivity is assumed
to be an inspection good; when the worker and a firm meets, they draw the productivity
and choose whether to match or not. Due to the selective exit from the unemployment
pool, the worker’s state variable changes with the duration of unemployment – a worker
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may be unemployed for a long time because he/she is unlucky (no meetings) or because
he/she drew bad productivity in all the meetings.
Since a worker’s history diverges when the worker switches from unemployed to employed,
(for the other case, employed to unemployed, it is assumed that the productivity draw that
triggered match dissolution is public) there is résumé effect in the wage determination and
match consummation through the unemployment value with a counterfactual résumé.
A parametrized version of the steady state equilibrium (new inflow of résumé is assumed
to follow a beta distribution) is calibrated to match the empirical job-finding hazard in
the CPS data. Two interesting findings emerge. First of all, the worker’s job finding rate
is single-peaked in his/her résumé. This is because there is more entry in the market for
mid-level résumés than the resume close to one; due to the fact that the workers accept
wage cuts to be hired in this region and the firms earn higher profit. As a matter fact, due
to this ‘information wedge’, initial wage varies significantly with résumé, and the worker
who receives the lowest starting wage is the worker with an intermediate resume facing the
largest information wedge. The author also suggests this as an explanation for increasing
wage-tenure relationship – the wage is expected to catch up very quickly when the following
productivity draws are observed during the employment.
Secondly, the model provides new insight into the interpretation of a negative correlation
between the job finding rate and the unemployment duration. In the micro level, the negative correlation in the aggregate level may either be because of decreasing job-finding rate,
or heterogeneous but constant job finding rates. The incomplete information framework can
account for both mechanisms and serves to amplify the effect (through both the change in
types and the change in hazard rate) compared to having only one mechanism. Making productivity deteriorate during unemployment flattens the information value of unemployment
and decreases the variability in job finding rates among different résumés.
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3.3.3. Worker Mobility with Adverse Selection: Carrillo-Tudela and Kaas (2015)
The paper is interested in worker mobility and wage dynamics when the firms post wage
contracts to screen workers of unknown quality. The authors study steady-state equilibrium
in a continuous time economy with two types of workers, H and L, with productivities
pH > pL , which are known to workers, but is unknown to the firms at the time of hiring.
It is assumed that the type is perfectly learned by the employer firm at the Poisson rate of
ρ > 0.
The learned productivity is verifiable and contractible at the point of hiring. The firm
posts a menu of contracts, intended for either H or L types, which specifies three wages:
starting wage, promotion wage in case the realized ability is true, and the demotion wage
in case the realized ability is false. In order to maximize the truth-telling incentives, the
firms optimally choose the promotion wage to be the full productivity of a worker, pi , while
demoting a misreported worker to the reservation wage (unemployment benefit b). The
authors solve for the equilibrium under these contractual assumptions, and later show that
there are no deviation incentives for a large set of reasonable parameters.
The form of the contract admits restricting attention only to the pair of wages in the
probation stage, (wH , wL ) intended for high and low types. Focusing on the rank preserving
equilibrium, in which there is one to one mapping from wH and the corresponding wL posted
by a single firm, the wage dispersion equilibrium as in Burdett and Mortensen (1998) arises
for job transitions in the probation stage. The equilibrium is calculated starting from the
pair of reservation wages (RH , RL ), the lowest offered in the equilibrium, and by working
up to the top wage pairs (w̄H , w̄L ) using the firms’ equal-profit condition. It is shown that
the incentive constraints are slack at the lowest contract offered. However, the constraint
might become binding for higher-ranked contracts.
Depending on the learning parameter ρ, there are two cases. When ρ is high enough, there
is a fully separating equilibrium: the high and low markets are perfectly segregated, and
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there is no demotion in equilibrium. When the learning rate is too low, it is difficult to
sustain the incentive compatibility constraint, and it might be that the low types want
to shift to a high-type probation wage despite the possibility of demotion. Due to the
presence of demotion in equilibrium, the low type workers exhibit both within-firm wage
cuts (by demotion) and between-firm wage cuts (when they shift to another firm after being
demoted). The equilibrium also exhibits the presence of pooling firms at the top of the
contract distribution, that kicks out a proportion of low type workers and sustains a large
proportion of high type workers (compared to other firms offering separating contracts.)
The authors test the quantitative implications of the model by setting the four parameters (λ, pH , pL , α) to match the targets (1) monthly job-to-job transition rate, (2) average
promotion gain, (3) average quit gain, and (4) average layoff loss observed in the NLSY
and Current Population Survey data. In the model, the low type workers transit jobs more
frequently because they are sometimes demoted after taking a pooling contract. This is
in line with OLS regressions on data (similar to the study by Light and McGarry (1998),
but with additional data on job-to-job transitions) which shows that both the counts of
non-employment spells and job-to-job transitions are negatively correlated wage. Although
the average wage gain from transition is calibrated to be positive, the negative link between
the counts is driven by worker heterogeneity. Since an IV regression accounting for the unobserved heterogeneity turns out positive coefficients, the authors conclude that the forces
of standard job ladder models are at work.
The authors also link their findings with a high level of internal mobility in large (pooling)
firms and lower tenure in small (separating) firms. They also suggest that the variation in
starting wage for small (separating) firms is larger than large (pooling) firms.
3.3.4. Visschers (2007)
Visschers (2007) solves for optimal wage contracts when neither the firm and the worker
are enforced to stay in the contractual relationship forever. Given a wage contract that is
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to be implemented whenever the match lasts, the participation risk comes from both sides.
The worker side incentives are as standard in on-the-job search literature: the worker may
generate an outside offer with a superior starting value, and hence quit the current job.
The firm has superior knowledge about the productivity of the match and terminates the
match if the worker’s productivity is not enough to generate profit given the promised wage
payment. The contract, the future sequence of wage payments, is agreed upon before the
match productivity is realized. Once the match is formed, the firm is privately informed
about the productivity of the worker. Hence, at the hiring stage, the worker correctly
anticipates the probability that, depending on the firm’s realization of productivity, some
of the promised future wages will not be paid.
Using a similar argument as in Stevens (2004), the author shows that the optimal wage, from
the firm’s retention point of view, is a step contract. Since the step contract always exhibits
increasing wages, it is optimal to fire a worker right away when the wage jumps above
his/her productivity. However, then it needs to be considered, in the surplus maximization
point of view, whether it is optimal to fire the low productivity workers by jumping to
a high wage (high productivity) or to keep the workers by jumping to a low wage (low
productivity). The two regimes trade off the retention probability of high productivity
workers, and the size of the labor force. In a no-firing contract, firms gain positive profit
over high productivity workers, but the workers might choose to quit to a better match. In
a firing contract, high types are less mobile and contribute to the surplus, but the surplus
from the low type match is lost. It is also possible that the wage jumps twice so that there
is an intermediate phase where low productivity pl is paid before finally jumping up to the
high productivity.

3.4. Conclusion
This paper has focused on the treatment of asymmetric information on the topics of onthe-job search in the labor market. Market trading, especially in the labor market, is
an area that provides a promising avenue for future research: many people are affected
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by the market’s organizational efficiency, and asymmetry of information is a real concern.
For instance, the market for CEOs and sports athletes seem to have a winner-take-all
property. The market greatly rewards a few successful characters, although the risk of such
a huge reward is also very well known. An interesting question is to address what are the
informational elements that serve as a leverage to extract a huge rent. In many markets
with imperfect competition, it is difficult to easily identify the ‘productivity’ or ‘use value’
of the good itself, while a large part of the rent comes from small differences. This also
includes how much others value the good as well as the intrinsic value itself. I argue that it
is important to tackle this question in general since we are living in a world where a large
volume of trade is carried out directly between producers and consumers. One application
would be online marketplaces which serve as platforms but not intervene in the transaction
itself.
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